

Resort Hotel Casino Law

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COMMERCIAL SPEECH BASICS

The U.S. Constitution – The First Amendment

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Central Hudson Opinion

U.S. Supreme Court
CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELEC. v. PUBLIC SERV. COMM'N, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) 447 U.S. 557
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
No. 79-565.

Held:

A regulation of appellee New York Public Service Commission which completely bans an electric utility from advertising to promote the use of electricity violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

(a) Although the Constitution accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression, nevertheless the First Amendment protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. For commercial speech to come within the First Amendment, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, it must be determined whether the asserted governmental interest to be served by the restriction on commercial speech is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, it must then be decided whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Pp. 561-566.

(b) In this case, it is not claimed that the expression at issue is either inaccurate or unlawful activity. Nor is appellant electrical utility's promotional advertising unprotected commercial speech merely because appellant holds a monopoly over the sale of electricity in its service area. Since monopoly over the supply of a product provides no protection from competition with substitutes for that product, advertising by utilities is just as valuable to consumers as advertising by unregulated firms, and there is no indication that appellant's decision to advertise was not based on the belief that consumers were interested in the advertising. Pp. 566-568.

(c) The State's interest in energy conservation is clearly substantial and is directly advanced by appellee's regulations. The State's further interest in preventing inequities in appellant's rates based on the assertion that successful promotion of consumption in "off-peak" periods would create extra costs that would, because of appellant's rate structure, be borne by all consumers through higher overall rates is also substantial. The latter interest does not, however, provide a constitutionally adequate reason for restricting protected speech because the link between the advertising prohibition and appellant's rate structure is, at most, tenuous. Pp. 568-569. [447 U.S. 557, 558]

(d) Appellee's regulation, which reaches all promotional advertising regardless of the impact of the touted service on overall energy use, is more extensive than necessary to further the State's interest in energy conservation which, as important as it is, cannot justify suppressing information about electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy use. In addition, no showing has been made that a more limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising would not serve adequately the State's interests. Pp. 569-571.

47 N. Y. 2d 94, 390 N. E. 2d 749, reversed.

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 572. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 573, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 579, filed opinions concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, J., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 583.

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The case presents the question whether a regulation of the Public Service Commission of the state of New York violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it completely bans promotional advertising by an electrical utility.

I

In December 1973, the Commission, appeals here, ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that "promot[es] the use of electricity." App. to Juris. [447 U.S. 557, 559] Statement 31a. The order was based on the Commission's finding that "the interconnected utility system in New York State does not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to continue furnishing all customer demands for the 1973-1974 winter." Id., at 26a.

Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., the appellant in this case, opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. App. A10. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977.

The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses "into two broad categories: promotional advertising intended to stimulate the purchase of utility services and institutional and informational, a broad category inclusive of all advertising not clearly intended to promote sales." 1 App. to Juris. Statement 35a. The Commission declared all promotional advertising contrary to the national policy of conserving energy. It acknowledged that the ban is not a perfect vehicle for conserving energy. For example, the Commissioner's order prohibits promotional advertising to develop consumption during periods when demand for electricity is low. By limiting growth in "off-peak" consumption, the ban limits the "beneficial side effects" of such growth in terms of more efficient use of existing powerplants. Id., at 37a. And since oil dealers are not under the Commissioner's jurisdiction and [447 U.S. 557, 560] thus remain free to advertise, it was recognized that the ban can achieve only "piecemeal conservationism." Still, the

Commission adopted the restriction because it was deemed likely to "result in some dampening of unnecessary growth" in energy consumption. *Ibid.*

The Commission's order explicitly permitted "informational" advertising designed to encourage "shifts of consumption" from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. *Ibid.* (emphasis in original). Information advertising would not seek to increase aggregate consumption, but would invite a leveling of demand throughout any given 24-hour period. The agency offered to review "specific proposals by the companies for specifically described [advertising] programs that meet these criteria." *Id.*, at 38a.

When it rejected requests for rehearing on the Policy Statement, the Commission supplemented its rationale for the advertising ban. The agency observed that additional electricity probably would be more expensive to produce than existing output. Because electricity rates in New York were not then based on marginal cost,² the Commission feared that additional power would be priced below the actual cost of generation. The additional electricity would be subsidized by all consumers through generally higher rates. *Id.*, at 57a-58a. The state agency also thought that promotional advertising would give "misleading signals" to the public by appearing to encourage energy consumption at a time when conservation is needed. *Id.*, at 59a.

Appellant challenged the order in state court, arguing that the Commission had restrained commercial speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.³ The Commission's [447 U.S. 557, 561] order was upheld by the trial court and at the intermediate appellate level.⁴ The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. It found little value to advertising in "the noncompetitive market in which electric corporations operate." *Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n*, 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 110, 390 N. E. 2d 749, 757 (1979). Since consumers "have no choice regarding the source of their electric power," the court denied that "promotional advertising of electricity might contribute to society's interest in 'informed and reliable' economic decisionmaking." *Ibid.* The court also observed that by encouraging consumption, promotional advertising would only exacerbate the current energy situation. *Id.*, at 110, 390 N. E. 2d, at 758. The court concluded that the governmental interest in the prohibition outweighed the limited constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue. We noted probable jurisdiction, 444 U.S. 962 (1979), and now reverse.

II

The Commission's order restricts only commercial speech, that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience. *Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council*, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); *Bates v. State Bar of Arizona* 433 U.S. 350, 363 -364 (1977); *Friedman v. Rogers*, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. *Virginia Pharmacy Board*, 425 U.S., at 761 -762. Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible [447 U.S. 557, 562] dissemination of information. In applying the First

Amendment to this area, we have rejected the "highly paternalistic" view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech. "[P]eople will perceive their own best interest if only they are well enough informed, and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them. . . ." *Id.*, at 770; see *Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro*, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977). Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all. *Bates v. State Bar of Arizona*, *supra*, at 374.

Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized "the `commonsense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech." *Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.*, 436 U.S. 447, 455 -456 (1978); see *Bates v. State Bar of Arizona*, *supra*, at 381; see also Jackson & Jeffries, *Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment*, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 38-39 (1979). 5 The [447 U.S. 557, 563] Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. 436 U.S., at 456 , 457. The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.

The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. See *First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, *Friedman v. Rogers*, *supra*, at 13, 15-16; *Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.*, *supra*, at 464-465, or [447 U.S. 557, 564] commercial speech related to illegal activity, *Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n*, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973). 6

If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government's power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.

Under the first criterion, the Court has declined to uphold regulations that only indirectly advance the state interest involved. In both *Bates* and *Virginia Pharmacy Board*, the Court concluded that an advertising ban could not be imposed to protect the ethical or performance standards of a profession. The Court noted in *Virginia Pharmacy Board* that "[t]he advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards one way or the other." 425 U.S., at 769 . In *Bates*, the Court overturned an advertising prohibition that

was designed to protect the "quality" of a lawyer's work. [447 U.S. 557, 565] "Restraints on advertising . . . are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy work." 433 U.S., at 378 . 7

The second criterion recognizes that the First Amendment mandates that speech restrictions be "narrowly drawn." In *re Primus*, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978). 8 The regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves. The State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted state interest, see *First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*, *supra*, at 794-795, nor can it completely suppress information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interest as well. For example, in *Bates* the Court explicitly did not "foreclose the possibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like might be required" in promotional materials. 433 U.S., at 384 . See *Virginia Pharmacy Board*, *supra*, at 773. And in *Carey v. Population Services International*, 431 U.S. 678, 701 -702 (1977), we held that the State's "arguments . . . do not justify the total suppression of advertising concerning contraceptives." This holding left open the possibility that [447 U.S. 557, 566] the State could implement more carefully drawn restrictions. See *id.*, at 712 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and in judgment); *id.*, at 716-717 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and in judgment). 9

In commercial speech cases, then, a **four-part analysis** has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

III

We now apply this **four-step analysis** for commercial speech to the Commission's arguments in support of its ban on promotional advertising.

...

The Central Hudson Test

The Central Hudson test recognizes the constitutionality of regulations restricting advertising that concerns an illegal product or service, or which is deceptive. For all other restrictions on commercial speech, however, the Court's test requires that the government show that the regulation directly advances an important interest and is no more restrictive of speech than necessary.

Questions

What are the four points of the Central Hudson test?

Under the Central Hudson test, should regulations and restrictions regarding gaming advertisements be permitted?

What factors are relevant to such an analysis as it applies to gaming?

ORIGINS OF FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS

Postal Restrictions

Since 1895, the federal government has played a role in the restriction of interstate advertising and promotion. In 1895, the federal prohibition on the interstate transportation or importation into the United States of lottery tickets and prize lists was adopted. Postal regulations were adopted prohibiting the distribution of lottery materials and advertisements.

18 U.S.C. § 1302. Mailing lottery tickets or related matter

Whoever knowingly deposits in the mail, or sends or delivers by mail:

Any letter, package, postal card, or circular concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance;

Any lottery ticket or part thereof, or paper, certificate, or instrument purporting to be or to represent a ticket, chance, share, or interest in or dependent upon the event of a lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance;

Any check, draft, bill, money, postal note, or money order, for the purchase of any ticket or part thereof, or of any share or chance in any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme;

Any newspaper, circular, pamphlet, or publication of any kind containing any advertisement of any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme of any kind offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or containing any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes;

Any article described in section 1953 of this title—

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both; and for any subsequent offense shall be imprisoned not more than five years.

Broadcast Media Restrictions

In 1934, the federal government's prohibition on the advertising of lotteries was expanded, as part of the Communications Act of 1934. The stated purpose was to create uniform postal and broadcast rules and to eliminate the radio stations' competitive advantage over newspapers resulting from the postal prohibitions against mailing newspapers that contained lottery advertisements. On the Congressional floor, the anti-lottery language was adopted without debate.

18 U.S.C. § 1304. Broadcasting lottery information

Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which a license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

Each day's broadcasting shall constitute a separate offense.

47 C.F.R. §73.1211 Broadcast of lottery information.

(a) No licensee of an AM, FM, television, or Class A television broadcast station, except as in paragraph (c) of this section, shall broadcast any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes. (18 U.S.C. 1304, 62 Stat. 763).

(b) The determination whether a particular program comes within the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section depends on the facts of each case. However, the Commission will in any event consider that a program comes within the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section if in connection with such program a prize consisting of money or other thing of value is awarded to any person whose

selection is dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, if as a condition of winning or competing for such prize, such winner or winners are required to furnish any money or other thing of value or are required to have in their possession any product sold, manufactured, furnished or distributed by a sponsor of a program broadcast on the station in question. (See 21 FCC 2d 846).

(c) The provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall not apply to an advertisement, list of prizes or other information concerning:

(1) A lottery conducted by a State acting under the authority of State law which is broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that State or any other State which conducts such a lottery. (18 U.S.C. 1307(a); 102 Stat. 3205).

(2) Fishing contests exempted under 18 U.S. Code 1305 (not conducted for profit, i.e., all receipts fully consumed in defraying the actual costs of operation).

(3) Any gaming conducted by an Indian Tribe pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.)

(4) A lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme, other than one described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, that is authorized or not otherwise prohibited by the State in which it is conducted and which is:

(i) Conducted by a not-for-profit organization or a governmental organization (18 U.S.C. 1307(a); 102 Stat. 3205); or

(ii) Conducted as a promotional activity by a commercial organization and is clearly occasional and ancillary to the primary business of that organization. (18 U.S.C. 1307(a); 102 Stat. 3205).

(d)(1) For purposes of paragraph (c) of this section, "lottery" means the pooling of proceeds derived from the sale of tickets or chances and allotting those proceeds or parts thereof by chance to one or more chance takers or ticket purchasers. It does not include the placing or accepting of bets or wagers on sporting events or contests.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this section, the term “not-for-profit organization” means any organization that would qualify as tax exempt under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

QUESTIONS

How does this affect casino advertising?

Should there be exceptions?

- (1) state-run lottery games 18 U.S.C. §1307 (a)(1);
- (2) horse racing and off-track betting;
- (3) lotteries run by non-profit organizations 18 U.S.C. §1307 (a)(2)(A);
- (4) promotional lotteries that are occasional and ancillary to another primary business 18 U.S.C. §1307 (a)(2)(B);
- (5) gaming conducted by an Indian tribe pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ; and
- (6) winner-take-all poker tournaments¹.

How does this effect sweepstakes?

How do you think the FCC distinguishes sweepstakes from gambling?

¹ The FCC held that a winner-take-all elimination poker tournament is not a lottery, though the same logic does not apply to slot tournaments. The apparent difference is the amount of skill involved in poker as opposed to slot machine play. The FCC was not persuaded that “the advantage gained from the ability to play quickly is not sufficient to change a slot machine tournament from a game primarily of chance to a game primarily of skill.” *Calnevar Broadcasting, Inc.*, 8 F.C.C.R. 32 (1992).

DIRECT vs. INDIRECT ADVERTISING & THE FCC

The FCC has consistently held that broadcasts for traditional lotteries, absent a statutory exemption, violated both its regulations and federal law. For example, in *Liability of i.B. Broadcasting*, the FCC assessed a \$1,000 fine against i.B. for broadcasting announcements promoting a lottery. The announcement stated "the Five Jokers Club is raffling a Mustang and the chance is only one dollar and you don't have to be present to win." The station claimed its manager made the decision to broadcast because he did not believe the announcement concerned a lottery. The FCC rejected this argument and found the required Section 1304 elements of chance, price and consideration to be present.

Indirect promotion of a lottery is not actionable under Section 1304. To be indirect, the broadcast cannot mention or promote the lottery, but may result in the listener being exposed to the lottery through other means. In the context of casino gambling, this means that a casino can promote its non-gaming activities even though it results in persons visiting the casino and being exposed to its casino games.

The FCC interpretation of what can be advertised is limited. The only reference that a gambling establishment can make to its gambling activity is the use of "gambling" words in its name, such as THE LUCKY DOG CASINO or THE BIG BUCKS GAMBLING HALL. In *KCFX, Inc.*, the FCC distinguished the use of the word "casino" in the establishment's name, from its use in a sentence. Therefore, a station could use the Sam's Town Casino, but not "[a] place called Sam's Town. It's a casino." In effect, the FCC held the word casino cannot be used "standing alone."

This FCC position has been consistently applied in other cases. In *DR. Partners*, the FCC fined a station for a television commercial that showed an automobile with the words "Bonanza Casino, Live Entertainment 4720 N. Virginia St. The friendliest casino in Reno, NV." The FCC held that the words "friendliest casino" promoted a lottery. It reiterated that the word casino could only be broadcast as "part of the legal name of a multipurpose establishment." The FCC found unpersuasive that an exception should exist for use of the word "casino" in a service mark. It stated "if, a phrase promotes lottery activities, it does not fall beyond the scope of lottery proscriptions by being part of a service mark type of a slogan." Even use of the word "casino" in a sentence to refer to the establishment is prohibited. For example, a casino may not state "[t]his is what you've been waiting for a hotel/casino that loves to party."

Casinos often attempt to insert suggestive language or actions to indirectly promote their gambling activities. The FCC, however, has uniformly held such approaches directly promote a lottery. In *KCFX, Inc.*, the FCC fined a FM radio station for airing a commercial for a casino that contained the words "take a chance. Yea. Everybody wins when you do the Flamingo." In *NAL re: DR. Partners*, a station was fined for lyrics in a casino commercial that included "play with us, stay with us." The

FCC, however, has approved the term “Vegas-style excitement” in the context of promoting the non-lottery related activities of an establishment such as entertainment.

Besides words, the FCC has rejected commercials where the background noise suggests that gambling activities are taking place. For example, a commercial for a casino/hotel where persons hears the familiar winning bells and sounds from slot machines would probably be prohibited by the commission.

Questions

How would you counsel a casino client regarding the development of a national advertising campaign?

Where do you think the line should be drawn?

The Posadas Court Opinion

U.S. Supreme Court
POSADAS de PUERTO RICO ASSOC. v. TOURISM CO., 478 U.S. 328 (1986)
478 U.S. 328
POSADAS de PUERTO RICO ASSOCIATES, DBA CONDADO HOLIDAY INN
v. TOURISM COMPANY OF PUERTO RICO ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO
No. 84-1903.

Argued April 28, 1986.

Decided July 1, 1986.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we address the facial constitutionality of a Puerto Rico statute and regulations restricting advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, doing business in Puerto Rico as Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino, filed suit against appellee Tourism Company of Puerto Rico in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section. Appellant [478 U.S. 328, 331] sought a declaratory judgment that the statute and regulations, both facially and as applied by the Tourism Company, impressively suppressed commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment and the equal protection and due process guarantees of the United States Constitution. 1 The Superior Court held that the advertising restrictions had been unconstitutionally applied to appellant's past conduct. But the court adopted a narrowing construction of the statute and regulations and held that, based on such a construction, both were facially constitutional. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dismissed an appeal on the ground that it "d[id] not present a substantial constitutional question." We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits. 474 U.S. 917 (1985). We now hold that we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and we affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico with respect to the facial constitutionality of the advertising restrictions.

In 1948, the Puerto Rico Legislature legalized certain forms of casino gambling. The Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948 (Act), authorized the playing of roulette, dice, and card games in licensed "gambling rooms." 2, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, 71 (1972). Bingo and slot machines were later added to the list of authorized games of chance under the Act. See Act of June 7, 1948, No. 21, 1 (bingo); Act of July 30, 1974, No. 2, pt. 2, 2 (slot machines). The legislature's intent was set forth in the Act's Statement of Motives: [478 U.S. 328, 332]

"The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the development of tourism by means of the authorization of certain games of chance which are customary in the recreation places of the great tourist centers of the world, and by the establishment of regulations for and the strict surveillance of said games by the government, in order to ensure for tourists the best possible safeguards, while at the same time opening for the Treasurer of Puerto Rico an additional source of income." Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948, 1.

The Act also provided that "[n]o gambling room shall be permitted to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico." 8, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, 77 (1972).

The Act authorized the Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico to issue and enforce regulations implementing the various provisions of the Act. See 7(a), codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, 76a (1972). Appellee Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, a public corporation, assumed the regulatory powers of the Economic Development Administration under the Act in 1970. See Act of June 18, 1970, No. 10, 17, codified at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 23, 671p (Supp. 1983). The two regulations at issue

in this case were originally issued in 1957 for the purpose of implementing the advertising restrictions contained in 8 of the Act. Regulation 76-218 basically reiterates the language of 8. See 15 R. & R. P. R. 76-218 (1972). Regulation 76a-1(7), as amended in 1971, provides in pertinent part:

"No concessionaire, nor his agent or employee is authorized to advertise the gambling parlors to the public in Puerto Rico. The advertising of our games of chance is hereby authorized through newspapers, magazines, radio, television and other publicity media outside Puerto Rico subject to the prior editing and approval by [478 U.S. 328, 333] the Tourism Development Company of the advertisement to be submitted in draft to the Company." 15 R. & R. P. R. 76a-1(7) (1972).

In 1975, appellant Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, a partnership organized under the laws of Texas, obtained a franchise to operate a gambling casino and began doing business under the name Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino. 2 In 1978, appellant was twice fined by the Tourism Company for violating the advertising restrictions in the Act and implementing regulations. Appellant protested the fines in a series of letters to the Tourism Company. On February 16, 1979, the Tourism Company issued to all casino franchise holders a memorandum setting forth the following interpretation of the advertising restrictions:

"This prohibition includes the use of the word 'casino' in matchbooks, lighters, envelopes, inter-office and/or external correspondence, invoices, napkins, brochures, menus, elevators, glasses, plates, lobbies, banners, flyers, paper holders, pencils, telephone books, directories, bulletin boards or in any hotel dependency or object which may be accessible to the public in Puerto Rico." App. 7a.

Pursuant to this administrative interpretation, the Tourism Company assessed additional fines against appellant. The Tourism Company ordered appellant to pay the outstanding total of \$1,500 in fines by March 18, 1979, or its gambling franchise would not be renewed. Appellant continued to protest the fines, but ultimately paid them without seeking judicial review of the decision of the Tourism Company. In July 1981, appellant was again fined for violating the advertising restrictions. Faced with another threatened nonrenewal [478 U.S. 328, 334] of its gambling franchise, appellant paid the \$500 fine under protest. 3

...

Because this case involves the restriction of pure commercial speech which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction," *Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976), 7 our First Amendment analysis is guided by the general principles identified in *Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York*, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See *Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel*, 471 U.S. 626, 637-638 (1985). Under *Central Hudson*, commercial speech receives a limited form of First Amendment protection so long as it concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading or fraudulent. Once it is determined that the First Amendment applies to the particular kind of commercial speech at issue, then the speech may be restricted only if the government's interest in doing so is substantial, the restrictions directly advance the government's asserted interest, and the restrictions are no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 447 U.S., at 566.

The particular kind of commercial speech at issue here, namely, advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico, concerns a lawful activity and is not [478 U.S. 328, 341] misleading or fraudulent, at least in the abstract. We must therefore proceed to the three remaining steps of the *Central Hudson* analysis in order to determine whether Puerto Rico's advertising restrictions run afoul of the First Amendment. The first of these three steps involves an assessment of the strength of the government's interest in restricting the speech. The interest at stake in this case, as determined by the Superior Court, is the reduction of demand for casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant acknowledged the existence of this interest in its February 24, 1982, letter to the Tourism Company. See App. to Juris. Statement 2h ("The legislators wanted the tourists to flock to the casinos to gamble, but not our own people"). The Tourism Company's brief before this Court explains the legislature's belief that "[e]xcessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime." Brief for Appellees 37. These are some of the very same concerns, of course, that have motivated

the vast majority of the 50 States to prohibit casino gambling. We have no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto Rico Legislature's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a "substantial" governmental interest. Cf. *Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.*, [475 U.S. 41, 54](#) (1986) (city has substantial interest in "preserving the quality of life in the community at large").

The last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration of the "fit" between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. Step three asks the question whether the challenged restrictions on commercial speech "directly advance" the government's asserted interest. In the instant case, the answer to this question is clearly "yes." The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously [\[478 U.S. 328, 342\]](#) believed, when it enacted the advertising restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product advertised. We think the legislature's belief is a reasonable one, and the fact that appellant has chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates that appellant shares the legislature's view. See *Central Hudson*, *supra*, at 569 ("There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity. *Central Hudson* would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its sales"); cf. *Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego*, [453 U.S. 490, 509](#) (1981) (plurality opinion of WHITE, J.) (finding third prong of Central Hudson test satisfied where legislative judgment "not manifestly unreasonable").

Appellant argues, however, that the challenged advertising restrictions are underinclusive because other kinds of gambling such as horse racing, cockfighting, and the lottery may be advertised to the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant's argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, whether other kinds of gambling are advertised in Puerto Rico or not, the restrictions on advertising of casino gambling "directly advance" the legislature's interest in reducing demand for games of chance. See *id.*, at 511 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J.) ("[W]hether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising"). Second, the legislature's interest, as previously identified, is not necessarily to reduce demand for all games of chance, but to reduce demand for casino gambling. According to the Superior Court, horse racing, cockfighting, "picas," or small games of chance at fiestas, and the lottery "have been traditionally part of the Puerto Rican's roots," so that "the legislator could have been more flexible than in authorizing more sophisticated games [\[478 U.S. 328, 343\]](#) which are not so widely sponsored by the people." App. to Juris. Statement 35b. In other words, the legislature felt that for Puerto Ricans the risks associated with casino gambling were significantly greater than those associated with the more traditional kinds of gambling in Puerto Rico. [8](#) In our view, the legislature's separate classification of casino gambling, for purposes of the advertising ban, satisfies the third step of the Central Hudson analysis.

We also think it clear beyond peradventure that the challenged statute and regulations satisfy the fourth and last step of the Central Hudson analysis, namely, whether the restrictions on commercial speech are no more extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest. The narrowing constructions of the advertising restrictions announced by the Superior Court ensure that the restrictions will not affect advertising of casino gambling aimed at tourists, but will apply only to such advertising when aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico. See also n. 7, *infra*; cf. *Oklahoma Telecasters* [\[478 U.S. 328, 344\]](#) *Assn. v. Crisp*, 699 F.2d 490, 501 (CA10 1983), *rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp*, [467 U.S. 691](#) (1984). Appellant contends, however, that the First Amendment requires the Puerto Rico Legislature to reduce demand for casino gambling among the residents of Puerto Rico not by suppressing commercial speech that might encourage such gambling, but by promulgating additional speech designed to discourage it. We reject this contention. We think it is up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a "counterspeech" policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising. The legislature could conclude, as it apparently did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct. Cf. *Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell*, 333 F. Supp. 582, 585 (DC 1971) (three-judge court) ("Congress had convincing evidence that the Labeling Act of 1965 had not materially reduced the incidence of smoking"), *summarily aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General*, [405 U.S. 1000](#) (1972); *Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss.*, 718

F.2d 738, 751 (CA5 1983) (en banc) ("We do not believe that a less restrictive time, place and manner restriction, such as a disclaimer warning of the dangers of alcohol, would be effective. The state's concern is not that the public is unaware of the dangers of alcohol. . . . The concern instead is that advertising will unduly promote alcohol consumption despite known dangers"), cert. denied, [467 U.S. 1259](#) (1984).

In short, we conclude that the statute and regulations at issue in this case, as construed by the Superior Court, pass muster under each prong of the Central Hudson test. We therefore hold that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico properly rejected appellant's First Amendment claim. [9](#) [478 U.S. 328, 345]

Appellant argues, however, that the challenged advertising restrictions are constitutionally defective under our decisions in *Carey v. Population Services International*, [431 U.S. 678](#) (1977), and *Bigelow v. Virginia*, [421 U.S. 809](#) (1975). In *Carey*, this Court struck down a ban on any "advertisement or display" of contraceptives, [431 U.S., at 700](#) -702, and in *Bigelow*, we reversed a criminal conviction based on the advertisement of an abortion clinic. We think appellant's argument ignores a crucial distinction between the *Carey* and *Bigelow* decisions and the instant case. In *Carey* and *Bigelow*, the underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited by the State. Here, on the other hand, [*the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have prohibited casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether. In our view, the greater power to \[478 U.S. 328, 346\] completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling, and Carey and Bigelow are hence inapposite.*](#)

Appellant also makes the related argument that, having chosen to legalize casino gambling for residents of Puerto Rico, the legislature is prohibited by the First Amendment from using restrictions on advertising to accomplish its goal of reducing demand for such gambling. We disagree. In our view, appellant has the argument backwards. As we noted in the preceding paragraph, it is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising. It would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino owners such as appellant to gain recognition of a First Amendment right to advertise their casinos to the residents of Puerto Rico, only to thereby force the legislature into banning casino gambling by residents altogether. It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased demand. Legislative regulation of products or activities deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prostitution, has varied from outright prohibition on the one hand, see, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. 647(b) (West Supp. 1986) (prohibiting soliciting or engaging in act of prostitution), to legalization of the product or activity with restrictions on stimulation of its demand on the other hand, see, e. g., Nev. Rev. Stat. 244.345(1), (8) (1986) (authorizing licensing of houses of prostitution except in counties with more than 250,000 population), 201.430, 201.440 (prohibiting advertising of houses of prostitution "[i]n any public theater, on the public streets of any city or town, or on any public highway," [\[478 U.S. 328, 347\]](#) or "in [a] place of business"). [10](#) To rule out the latter, intermediate kind of response would require more than we find in the First Amendment.

Appellant's final argument in opposition to the advertising restrictions is that they are unconstitutionally vague. In particular, appellant argues that the statutory language, "to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities," and "the public of Puerto Rico," are not sufficiently defined to satisfy the requirements of due process. Appellant also claims that the term "anunciarse," which appears in the controlling Spanish version of the statute, is actually broader than the English term "to advertise," and could be construed to mean simply "to make known." Even assuming that appellant's argument has merit with respect to the bare statutory language, however, we have already noted that we are bound by the Superior Court's narrowing construction of the statute. Viewed in light of that construction, and particularly with the interpretive assistance of the implementing regulations as [\[478 U.S. 328, 348\]](#) modified by the Superior Court, we do not find the statute unconstitutionally vague.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico that, as construed by the Superior Court, 8 of the Games of Chance Act of 1948 and the implementing regulations do not facially violate the First Amendment or the due process or equal protection guarantees of the Constitution, is affirmed. [11](#)

It is so ordered.

Footnotes

[[Footnote 1](#)] We have held that Puerto Rico is subject to the First Amendment Speech Clause, *Balzac v. Porto Rico*, [258 U.S. 298, 314](#) (1922), the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment, *Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.*, [416 U.S. 663, 668](#) -669, n. 5 (1974), and the equal protection guarantee of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment, *Examining Board v. Flores de Otero*, [426 U.S. 572, 599](#) -601 (1976). See generally *Torres v. Puerto Rico*, [442 U.S. 465, 468](#) -471 (1979).

[[Footnote 2](#)] The hotel was purchased in 1983 by Williams Electronics Corporation, is now organized as a public corporation under Delaware law as *Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, Inc.*, and does business in Puerto Rico as *Condado Plaza Hotel and Casino*.

[[Footnote 3](#)] News of the Tourism Company's decision to levy the fine against appellant reached the New Jersey Gaming Commission, and caused the Commission to consider denying a petition filed by appellant's parent company for a franchise to operate a casino in that State.

[[Footnote 4](#)] In addition to its decision concerning the advertising restrictions, the Superior Court declared unconstitutional a regulation, 15 R. & R. P. R. 76a-4(e) (1972), that required male casino patrons to wear dinner jackets while in the casino. The court described the dinner jacket requirement as "basically a condition of sex" and found that the legislature "has no reasonable interest which would warrant a dissimilar classification" based on sex. See App. to Juris. Statement 35b-36b.

[[Footnote 5](#)] Under Puerto Rico law, the notice of appeal apparently was due in the Clerk's Office by 5 p.m. on the 30th day following the docketing of the Superior Court's judgment. Supreme Court of Puerto Rico Rule 48(a). The certificate of the Acting Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico indicates that appellant's notice of appeal was filed at 5:06 p.m. on the 30th day.

[[Footnote 6](#)] A rigid rule of deference to interpretations of Puerto Rico law by Puerto Rico courts is particularly appropriate given the unique cultural and legal history of Puerto Rico. See *Diaz v. Gonzalez*, [261 U.S. 102, 105](#) -106 (1923) (Holmes, J.) ("This Court has stated many times the deference due to the understanding of the local courts upon matters of purely local concern. . . . This is especially true in dealing with the decisions of a Court inheriting and brought up in a different system from that which prevails here").

[[Footnote 7](#)] The narrowing construction of the statute and regulations announced by the Superior Court effectively ensures that the advertising restrictions cannot be used to inhibit either the freedom of the press in Puerto Rico to report on any aspect of casino gambling, or the freedom of anyone, including casino owners, to comment publicly on such matters as legislation relating to casino gambling. See *Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel*, [471 U.S. 626, 637](#) -638, n. 7 (1985) (noting that Ohio's ban on advertising of legal services in *Dalkon Shield* cases "has placed no general restrictions on appellant's right to publish facts or express opinions regarding *Dalkon Shield* litigation"); *Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations*, [413 U.S. 376, 391](#) (1973) (emphasizing that "nothing in our holding allows government at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to publish and distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance, the enforcement practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preferences in employment"); *Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment*, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 35, n. 125 (1979) (such "'political' dialogue is at the core of . . . the first amendment").

[[Footnote 8](#)] The history of legalized gambling in Puerto Rico supports the Superior Court's view of the legislature's intent. Casino gambling was prohibited in Puerto Rico for most of the first half of this century. See Puerto Rico Penal Code, 299, Rev. Stats. and Codes of Porto Rico (1902). The Puerto Rico Penal Code of 1937 made it a misdemeanor to deal, play, carry on, open, or conduct "any game of faro, monte, roulette, fantan, poker, seven and a half, twenty one, hoky-poky, or any game of chance played with cards, dice or any device for money, checks, credit, or other representative of value." See P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 33, 1241 (1983). This longstanding prohibition of casino gambling stood in stark contrast to the Puerto Rico Legislature's early legalization of horse racing, see Act of Mar. 10, 1910, No. 23, repealed, Act of Apr. 13, 1916, No. 28, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, 181-197 (1972 and Supp. 1985); "picas," see Act of Apr. 23, 1927, No. 25, 1, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, 80 (1972); dog racing, see Act of Apr. 20, 1936, No. 35, repealed, Act of June 4, 1957, No. 10, 1, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, 231 (1972) (prohibiting dog racing); cockfighting, see Act of Aug. 12, 1933, No. 1, repealed, Act of May 12, 1942, No. 236, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, 292-299 (1972); and the Puerto Rico lottery, see J. R. No. 37, May 14, 1934, repealed, Act of May 15, 1938, No. 212 see P. R. Laws Ann. Tit 15. 111-128 (1972 and Supp. 1985).

[[Footnote 9](#)] It should be apparent from our discussion of the First Amendment issue, and particularly the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson [\[478 U.S. 328, 345\]](#) test, that appellant can fare no better under the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution. Cf. *Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.*, [475 U.S. 41, 55](#), n. 4 (1986). If there is a sufficient "fit" between the legislature's means and ends to satisfy the concerns of the First Amendment, the same "fit" is surely adequate under the applicable "rational basis" equal protection analysis. See *Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss.*, 718 F.2d 738, 752-753 (CA5 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, [467 U.S. 1259](#) (1984). JUSTICE STEVENS, in dissent, asserts the additional equal protection claim, not raised by appellant either below or in this Court, that the Puerto Rico statute and regulations impressibly discriminate between different kinds of publications. Post, at 359-360. JUSTICE STEVENS misunderstands the nature of the Superior Court's limiting construction of the statute and regulations. According to the Superior Court, "[i]f the object of [an] advertisement is the tourist, it passes legal scrutiny." See App. to Juris. Statement 40b. It is clear from the court's opinion that this basic test applies regardless of whether the advertisement appears in a local or nonlocal publication. Of course, the likelihood that a casino advertisement appearing in the New York Times will be primarily addressed to tourists, and not Puerto Rico residents, is far greater than would be the case for a similar advertisement appearing in the San Juan Star. But it is simply the demographics of the two newspapers' readerships, and not any form of "discrimination" on the part of the Puerto Rico Legislature or the Superior Court, which produces this result.

[[Footnote 10](#)] See also 15 U.S.C. 1335 (prohibiting cigarette advertising "on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission"), upheld in *Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell*, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 1971), summarily aff'd sub nom. *Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General*, [405 U.S. 1000](#) (1972); Fla. Stat. 561.42(10)-(12) (1985) (prohibiting all signs except for one sign per product in liquor store windows); Mass. Gen. Laws 138:24 (1974) (authorizing Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission to regulate liquor advertising); Miss. Code Ann. 67-1-85 (Supp. 1985) (prohibiting most forms of liquor sign advertising), upheld in *Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss.*, supra; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 4301.03(E), 4301.211 (1982) (authorizing Liquor Control Commission to regulate liquor advertising and prohibiting off-premises advertising of beer prices), upheld in *Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n*, 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N. E. 2d 138, appeal dism'd for want of a substantial federal question, [459 U.S. 807](#) (1982); Okla. Const., Art. 27, 5, and Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, 516 (1981) (prohibiting all liquor advertising except for one storefront sign), upheld in *Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp*, 699 F.2d 490 (CA10 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. *Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp*, [467 U.S. 691](#) (1984); Utah Code Ann 32-7-26 to 32-7-28 (1974) (repealed 1985) (prohibiting all liquor advertising except for one storefront sign).

[[Footnote 11](#)] JUSTICE STEVENS claims that the Superior Court's narrowing construction creates an impressible "prior restraint" on protected speech, because that court required the submission of certain casino advertising to appellee for its prior approval. See post, at 361. This argument was not raised by appellant either below or in this Court, and we therefore express no view on the constitutionality of the particular portion of the Superior Court's narrowing construction cited by JUSTICE STEVENS.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

The Puerto Rico Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948, legalizes certain forms of casino gambling in Puerto Rico. Section 8 of the Act nevertheless prohibits gambling casinos from "advertis[ing] or otherwise offer[ing] their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico." 8, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, 77 (1972). Because neither the language of 8 nor the applicable regulations define what constitutes "advertis[ing] or otherwise offer[ing] gambling] facilities to the public of Puerto Rico," appellee Tourism Company was found to have applied the Act in an arbitrary and confusing manner. To ameliorate this problem, the Puerto Rico Superior Court, to avoid a declaration of the unconstitutionality of 8, construed it to ban only advertisements or offerings directed to the residents of Puerto Rico, and listed examples of the kinds of advertisements that the court considered permissible under the Act. I doubt that this interpretation will assure that arbitrary and unreasonable [478 U.S. 328, 349] applications of 8 will no longer occur. 1 However, even assuming that appellee will now enforce 8 in a nonarbitrary manner, I do not believe that Puerto Rico constitutionally may suppress truthful commercial speech in order to discourage its residents from engaging in lawful activity.

I

It is well settled that the First Amendment protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. See *Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, [425 U.S. 748, 761-762](#) (1976). "Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information." *Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York*, [447 U.S. 557, 561-562](#) (1980). Our decisions have recognized, however, "the 'common-sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech." *Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.*, [436 U.S. 447, 455-456](#) (1978). We have therefore held that the Constitution "accords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression." *Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.*, [463 U.S. 60, 64-65](#) (1983). Thus, while the First Amendment ordinarily prohibits regulation of speech [478 U.S. 328, 350] based on the content of the communicated message, the government may regulate the content of commercial speech in order to prevent the dissemination of information that is false, deceptive, or misleading, see *Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel*, [471 U.S. 626, 638](#) (1985); *Friedman v. Rogers*, [440 U.S. 1, 14-15](#) (1979); *Ohralik*, *supra*, at 462, or that proposes an illegal transaction, see *Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations*, [413 U.S. 376](#) (1973). We have, however, consistently invalidated restrictions designed to deprive consumers of accurate information about products and services legally offered for sale. See e. g., *Bates v. State Bar of Arizona*, [433 U.S. 350](#) (1977) (lawyer's services); *Carey v. Population Services International*, [431 U.S. 678, 700-702](#) (1977) (contraceptives); *Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro*, [431 U.S. 85](#) (1977) (housing); *Virginia Pharmacy Board*, *supra* (pharmaceuticals); *Bigelow v. Virginia*, [421 U.S. 809](#) (1975) (abortions).

I see no reason why commercial speech should be afforded less protection than other types of speech where, as here, the government seeks to suppress commercial speech in order to deprive consumers of accurate information concerning lawful activity. Commercial speech is considered to be different from other kinds of protected expression because advertisers are particularly well suited to evaluate "the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity," *Central Hudson*, [447 U.S.](#), at [564](#), n. 6, and because "commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.'" *Ibid.* (quoting *Bates*, *supra*, at 381); see also *Friedman*, *supra*, at 10; *Virginia Pharmacy Board*, *supra*, at 772, n. 24. These differences, we have held, "justify a more permissive approach to regulation of the manner of commercial speech for the purpose of protecting consumers from deception or coercion, and these differences explain why doctrines designed to prevent 'chilling' of protected speech are inapplicable to commercial [478 U.S. 328, 351] speech." *Central Hudson*, *supra*, at 578 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment); see *Linmark Associates, Inc.*, *supra*, at 98; *Virginia Pharmacy Board*, *supra*, at 772, n. 24. However, no differences between commercial and other kinds of speech justify protecting commercial speech less

extensively where, as here, the government seeks to manipulate private behavior by depriving citizens of truthful information concerning lawful activities.

"Even though 'commercial' speech is involved, [this kind of restriction] strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. This is because it is a covert attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice. . . . [T]he State's policy choices are insulated from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation would entail and the conduct of citizens is molded by the information that government chooses to give them." *Central Hudson*, supra, at 574-575 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment).

See also Note, *Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech*, 82 *Colum. L. Rev.* 720, 750 (1982) ("Regulation of commercial speech designed to influence behavior by depriving citizens of information . . . violates basic [First Amendment] principles of viewpoint and public-agenda-neutrality"). Accordingly, I believe that where the government seeks to suppress the dissemination of nonmisleading commercial speech relating to legal activities, for fear that recipients will act on the information provided, such regulation should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.

II

The Court, rather than applying strict scrutiny, evaluates Puerto Rico's advertising ban under the relaxed standards normally used to test government regulation of commercial speech. Even under these standards, however, I do not [478 U.S. 328, 352] believe that Puerto Rico constitutionally may suppress all casino advertising directed to its residents. The Court correctly recognizes that "[t]he particular kind of commercial speech at issue here, namely, advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico, concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading or fraudulent." Ante, at 340-341. Under our commercial speech precedents, Puerto Rico constitutionally may restrict truthful speech concerning lawful activity only if its interest in doing so is substantial, if the restrictions directly advance the Commonwealth's asserted interest, and if the restrictions are no more extensive than necessary to advance that interest. See *Zauderer*, supra, at 638; *In re R. M. J.*, 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); *Central Hudson*, supra, at 564. While tipping its hat to these standards, the Court does little more than defer to what it perceives to be the determination by Puerto Rico's Legislature that a ban on casino advertising aimed at resident is reasonable. The Court totally ignores the fact that commercial speech is entitled to substantial First Amendment protection, giving the government unprecedented authority to eviscerate constitutionally protected expression.

A

The Court asserts that the Commonwealth has a legitimate and substantial interest in discouraging its residents from engaging in casino gambling. According to the Court, the legislature believed that "[e]xcessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime." Ante, at 341 (quoting Brief for Appellees 37). Neither the statute on its face nor the legislative history indicates that the Puerto Rico Legislature thought that serious harm would result if residents were allowed to engage in [478 U.S. 328, 353] casino gambling; 2 indeed, the available evidence suggests exactly the opposite. Puerto Rico has legalized gambling casinos, and permits its residents to patronize them. Thus, the Puerto Rico Legislature has determined that permitting residents to engage in casino gambling will not produce the "serious harmful effects" that have led a majority of States to ban such activity. Residents of Puerto Rico are also permitted to engage in a variety of other gambling activities including horse racing, "picas," cockfighting, and the Puerto Rico lottery all of which are allowed to advertise freely to residents. 3 Indeed, it is surely not farfetched to suppose [478 U.S. 328, 354] that the legislature chose to restrict casino advertising not because of the "evils" of casino gambling, but because it preferred that Puerto Ricans spend their gambling dollars on the Puerto Rico lottery. In any event, in light of the legislature's determination that serious harm will not result if residents are permitted and encouraged

to gamble, I do not see how Puerto Rico's interest in discouraging its residents from engaging in casino gambling can be characterized as "substantial," even if the legislature had actually asserted such an interest which, of course, it has not. Cf. *Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp*, [467 U.S. 691, 715](#) (1984) (Oklahoma's selective regulation of liquor advertising "suggests limits on the substantiality of the interests it asserts"); *Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego*, [453 U.S. 490, 532](#) (1981) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment) ("[I]f billboards alone are banned and no further steps are contemplated or likely, the commitment of the city to improving its physical environment is placed in doubt").

The Court nevertheless sustains Puerto Rico's advertising ban because the legislature could have determined that casino gambling would seriously harm the health, safety, and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens. Ante, at 344. [4](#) This [478 U.S. 328, 355] reasoning is contrary to this Court's long-established First Amendment jurisprudence. When the government seeks to place restrictions upon commercial speech, a court may not, as the Court implies today, simply speculate about valid reasons that the government might have for enacting such restrictions. Rather, the government ultimately bears the burden of justifying the challenged regulation, and it is incumbent upon the government to prove that the interests it seeks to further are real and substantial. See *Zauderer*, [471 U.S., at 641](#); *In re R. M. J.*, [455 U.S., at 205](#)-206; *Friedman*, [440 U.S., at 15](#). In this case, appellee has not shown that "serious harmful effects" will result if Puerto Rico residents gamble in casinos, and the legislature's decision to legalize such activity suggests that it believed the opposite to be true. In short, appellees have failed to show that a substantial government interest supports Puerto Rico's ban on protected expression.

B

Even assuming that appellee could show that the challenged restrictions are supported by a substantial governmental interest, this would not end the inquiry into their constitutionality. See *Linmark Associates*, [431 U.S., at 94](#); *Virginia Pharmacy Board*, [425 U.S., at 766](#). Appellee must still demonstrate that the challenged advertising ban directly advances Puerto Rico's interest in controlling the harmful effects allegedly associated with casino gambling. *Central Hudson*, [447 U.S., at 564](#). The Court proclaims that Puerto Rico's legislature "obviously believed . . . that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product advertised." Ante, at 341-342. However, even assuming that an advertising ban would effectively reduce residents' [478 U.S. 328, 356] patronage of gambling casinos, [5](#) it is not clear how it would directly advance Puerto Rico's interest in controlling the "serious harmful effects" the Court associates with casino gambling. In particular, it is unclear whether banning casino advertising aimed at residents would affect local crime, prostitution, the development of corruption, or the infiltration of organized crime. Because Puerto Rico actively promotes its casinos to tourists, these problems are likely to persist whether or not residents are also encouraged to gamble. Absent some showing that a ban on advertising aimed only at residents will directly advance Puerto Rico's interest in controlling the harmful effects allegedly associated with casino gambling, Puerto Rico may not constitutionally restrict protected expression in that way.

C

Finally, appellees have failed to show that Puerto Rico's interest in controlling the harmful effects allegedly associated with casino gambling "cannot be protected adequately by more limited regulation of appellant's commercial expression." *Central Hudson*, supra, at 570. Rather than suppressing constitutionally protected expression, Puerto Rico could seek directly to address the specific harms thought to be associated with casino gambling. Thus, Puerto Rico could continue carefully to monitor casino operations to guard against "the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime." Ante, at 341. It could vigorously enforce its criminal statutes to combat "the increase in local crime [and] the fostering of prostitution." *Ibid*. It could establish limits on the level of permissible betting, or promulgate additional [478 U.S. 328, 357] speech designed to discourage casino gambling among residents, in order to avoid the "disruption of moral and cultural patterns," *ibid.*, that might result if residents were to engage in excessive casino gambling. Such measures would directly address the problems appellee associates with casino gambling, while

avoiding the First Amendment problems raised where the government seeks to ban constitutionally protected speech.

The Court fails even to acknowledge the wide range of effective alternatives available to Puerto Rico, and addresses only appellant's claim that Puerto Rico's legislature might choose to reduce the demand for casino gambling among residents by "promulgating additional speech designed to discourage it." Ante, at 344. The Court rejects this alternative, asserting that "it is up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a 'counterspeech' policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising." Ibid. This reasoning ignores the commands of the First Amendment. Where the government seeks to restrict speech in order to advance an important interest, it is not, contrary to what the Court has stated, "up to the legislature" to decide whether or not the government's interest might be protected adequately by less intrusive measures. Rather, it is incumbent upon the government to prove that more limited means are not sufficient to protect its interests, and for a court to decide whether or not the government has sustained this burden. See *In re R. M. J.*, supra, at 206; *Central Hudson*, supra, at 571. In this case, nothing suggests that the Puerto Rico Legislature ever considered the efficacy of measures other than suppressing protected expression. More importantly, there has been no showing that alternative measures would inadequately safeguard the Commonwealth's interest in controlling the harmful effects allegedly associated with casino gambling. Under [478 U.S. 328, 358] these circumstances, Puerto Rico's ban on advertising clearly violates the First Amendment. [6](#)

The Court believes that Puerto Rico constitutionally may prevent its residents from obtaining truthful commercial speech concerning otherwise lawful activity because of the effect it fears this information will have. However, "[i]t is precisely this kind of choice between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us." *Virginia Pharmacy Board*, [425 U.S., at 770](#). "[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments." *First National Bank v. Bellotti*, [435 U.S. 765, 791](#) (1978). The First Amendment presupposes that "people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them." *Virginia Pharmacy Board*, supra, at 770. "[I]f there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate . . . information . . . it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment." *Bellotti*, supra, at 792; see also *Central Hudson*, [447 U.S., at 562](#) ("[T]he First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all"). Accordingly, I would hold that Puerto Rico may not suppress the dissemination of truthful information about entirely lawful activity merely to keep its residents ignorant. The Court, however, would allow Puerto Rico to do just that, thus dramatically shrinking the scope of First Amendment protection available to commercial speech, and giving government officials unprecedented authority to [478 U.S. 328, 359] eviscerate constitutionally protected expression. I respectfully dissent.

[[Footnote 1](#)] Beyond the specific areas addressed by the Superior Court's "guidelines," 8 must still be applied on a case-by-case basis; a casino advertisement "passes legal scrutiny" if "the object of the advertisement is the tourist." App. to Juris. Statement 40b. Appellee continues to insist that a newspaper photograph of appellant's slot machines constituted an impressible "advertisement," even though it was taken at a press conference called to protest legislative action. See Brief for Appellees 48. Thus, even under the narrowing construction made by the Superior Court, appellee would interpret 8 to prohibit casino owners from criticizing governmental policy concerning casino gambling if such speech is directed to the Puerto Rico residents who elect government officials, rather than to tourists.

[[Footnote 2](#)] The Act's Statement of Motives says only that "[t]he purpose of this Act is to contribute to the development of tourism by means of the authorization of certain games of chance . . . and by the establishment of regulations for and the strict surveillance of said games by the government, in order to ensure for tourists the best possible safeguards, while at the same time opening for the Treasurer of Puerto Rico an additional source of income." Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948, 1. There is no suggestion that discouraging residents from patronizing gambling casinos would further Puerto Rico's interests in developing tourism, ensuring safeguards for tourists, or producing additional revenue.

[[Footnote 3](#)] The Court seeks to justify Puerto Rico's selective prohibition of casino advertising by asserting that "the legislature felt that for Puerto Ricans the risks associated with casino gambling were significantly greater than those associated with the more traditional kinds of gambling in Puerto Rico." Ante, at 343. Nothing in the record suggests that the legislature believed this to be the case. Appellee has failed to show that casino gambling presents risks different from those associated with other gambling activities, such that Puerto Rico might, consistently with the First Amendment, choose to suppress only casino advertising directed to its residents. Cf. *Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego*, [453 U.S. 490, 534](#), n. 12 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment) (The First Amendment "demands more than a rational basis for preferring one kind of commercial speech over another"); *Schad v. Mount Ephraim*, [452 U.S. 61, 73](#) (1981) ("The [government] has presented no evidence, and it is not immediately apparent as a matter of experience, that live entertainment poses problems . . . more significant than those associated with various permitted uses"). For this reason, I believe that Puerto Rico's selective advertising ban also violates appellant's rights under the Equal Protection Clause. In rejecting appellant's equal protection claim, the Court erroneously uses a "rational basis" [[478 U.S. 328, 354](#)] analysis, thereby ignoring the important First Amendment interests implicated by this case. Cf. *Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley*, [408 U.S. 92](#) (1972).

[[Footnote 4](#)] The Court reasons that because Puerto Rico could legitimately decide to prohibit casino gambling entirely, it may also take the "less intrusive step" of legalizing casino gambling but restricting speech. Ante, at 346. According to the Court, it would "surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban [casino gambling] but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for [casino gambling]" by banning advertising. *Ibid.* I do not agree that a ban on casino advertising is "less intrusive" than an outright prohibition of such activity. A majority of States have chosen not to legalize casino gambling, and we have never suggested that this might be unconstitutional. However, having decided to legalize casino gambling, Puerto Rico's decision to ban truthful speech concerning entirely lawful activity raises serious First Amendment problems. Thus, [[478 U.S. 328, 355](#)] the "constitutional doctrine" which bans Puerto Rico from banning advertisements concerning lawful casino gambling is not so strange a restraint it is called the First Amendment.

[[Footnote 5](#)] Unlike the Court, I do not read the fact that appellant has chosen to litigate the case here to necessarily indicate that appellant itself believes that Puerto Rico residents would respond to casino advertising. In light of appellees' arbitrary and capricious application of 8, appellant could justifiably have believed that, notwithstanding the Superior Court's "narrowing" construction, its First Amendment rights could be safeguarded effectively only if the Act was invalidated on its face.

[[Footnote 6](#)] The Court seeks to buttress its holding by noting that some States have regulated other "harmful" products, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and legalized prostitution, by restricting advertising. While I believe that Puerto Rico may not prohibit all casino advertising directed to its residents, I reserve judgment as to the constitutionality of the variety of advertising restrictions adopted by other jurisdictions.

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

The Court concludes that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling." Ante, at 345-346. Whether a State may ban all advertising of an activity that it permits but could prohibit such as gambling, prostitution, or the consumption of marijuana or liquor is an elegant question of constitutional law. It is not, however, appropriate to address that question in this case because Puerto Rico's rather bizarre restraints on speech are so plainly forbidden by the First Amendment.

Puerto Rico does not simply "ban advertising of casino gambling." Rather, Puerto Rico blatantly discriminates in its punishment of speech depending on the publication, audience, and words employed. Moreover, the prohibitions, as now construed by the Puerto Rico courts, establish a regime of prior restraint and articulate a standard that is hopelessly vague and unpredictable.

With respect to the publisher, in stark, unabashed language, the Superior Court's construction favors certain identifiable publications and disfavors others. If the publication (or medium) is from outside Puerto Rico, it is very favored indeed. "Within the ads of casinos allowed by this regulation figure . . . movies, television, radio, newspapers, and trade magazines which may be published, taped, or filmed in the exterior for tourism promotion in the exterior even though they may be exposed or incidentally circulated in Puerto Rico. For example: an advertisement in the New York Times, an advertisement in CBS which reaches us through Cable TV, whose main objective is to reach the potential tourists." App. to Juris. Statement 38b-39b. If the publication is native to Puerto Rico, however the San Juan Star, for instance it is subject to a far more rigid system of [478 U.S. 328, 360] restraints and controls regarding the manner in which a certain form of speech (casino ads) may be carried in its pages. Unless the Court is prepared to uphold an Illinois regulation of speech that subjects the New York Times to one standard and the Chicago Tribune to another, I do not understand why it is willing to uphold a Puerto Rico regulation that applies one standard to the New York Times and another to the San Juan Star.

With respect to the audience, the newly construed regulations plainly discriminate in terms of the intended listener or reader. Casino advertising must be "addressed to tourists." Id., at 38b. It must not "invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casino." Ibid. The regulation thus poses what might be viewed as a reverse privileges and immunities problem: Puerto Rico's residents are singled out for disfavored treatment in comparison to all other Americans. ¹But nothing so fancy is required to recognize the obvious First Amendment problem in this kind of audience discrimination. I cannot imagine that this Court would uphold an Illinois regulation that forbade advertising "addressed" to Illinois residents while allowing the same advertiser to communicate his message to visitors and commuters; we should be no more willing to uphold a Puerto Rico regulation that forbids advertising "addressed" to Puerto Rico residents.

With respect to the message, the regulations now take one word of the English language "casino" and give it a special opprobrium. Use of that suspicious six-letter word is permitted only "where the trade name of the hotel is used even though it may contain a reference to the casino." Id., at 39b. The regulations explicitly include an important provision [478 U.S. 328, 361] "that the word casino is never used alone nor specified." Ibid. (The meaning of "specified" perhaps italicization, or boldface, or all capital letters is presumably left to subsequent case-by-case adjudication.) Singling out the use of a particular word for official sanctions raises grave First Amendment concerns, and Puerto Rico has utterly failed to justify the disfavor in which that particular six-letter word is held.

With respect to prior restraint, the Superior Court's opinion establishes a regime of censorship. In a section of the opinion that the majority fails to include, ante, at 335, the court explained:

"We hereby authorize the publicity of the casinos in newspapers, magazines, radio, television or any other publicity media, of our games of [chance] in the exterior with the previous approval of the Tourism Company regarding the text of said ad, which must be submitted in draft to the Company. Provided, however, that no photographs, or pictures may be approval of the Company." App. to Juris. Statement 38b (emphasis added).

A more obvious form of prior restraint is difficult to imagine.

With respect to vagueness, the Superior Court's construction yields no certain or predictable standards for Puerto Rico's suppression of particular kinds of speech. Part of the problem lies in the delineation of permitted speech in terms of the audience to which it is addressed. The Puerto Rico court stated that casino ads within Puerto Rico are permissible "provided they do not invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casino, even though such announcements may incidentally reach the hands of a resident." Id., at 38b. At oral argument, Puerto Rico's counsel stated that a casino advertisement in a publication with 95% local circulation perhaps the San Juan Star might actually be permissible, so [478 U.S. 328, 362] long as the advertisement "is addressed to tourists and not to residents." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. Then again, maybe not. Maybe such an ad would not be permissible, and maybe there would be considerable uncertainty about the nature of the required "address." For the Puerto Rico court was not particularly concerned with the precise limits of the oddly selective ban on public speech that it was announcing. The court noted: "Since a clausus enumeration of this regulation is unforeseeable, any other situation or incident relating to the legal

restriction must be measured in light of the public policy of promoting tourism." App. to Juris. Statement 40b. And in a passage that should chill, not only would-be speakers, but reviewing courts as well, the Superior Court expressly noted that there was nothing immutable about its supposedly limiting and saving construction of the restraints on speech: "These guide-regulations may be amended in the future by the enforcing agency pursuant to the dictates of the changing needs and in accordance with the law and what is resolved herein." Id., at 42b. [2](#) [478 U.S. 328, 363]

The general proposition advanced by the majority today that a State may prohibit the advertising of permitted conduct if it may prohibit the conduct altogether bears little resemblance to the grotesquely flawed regulation of speech advanced by Puerto Rico in this case. [3](#) The First Amendment surely does not permit Puerto Rico's frank discrimination among publications, audiences, and words. Nor should sanctions for speech be as unpredictable and haphazardous as the roll of dice in a casino.

I respectfully dissent.

[[Footnote 1](#)] Perhaps, since Puerto Rico somewhat ambivalently regards a gambling casino as a good thing for the local proprietor and an evil for the local patrons, the ban on local advertising might be viewed as a form of protection against the poison that Puerto Rico uses to attract strangers into its web. If too much speech about the poison were permitted, local residents might not only partake of it but also decide to prohibit it.

[[Footnote 2](#)] The unpredictable character of the censorship envisioned by the Superior Court is perhaps illustrated by its decision, apparently sua sponte, Tr of Oral Arg. 43, to invalidate a regulation that required male patrons of casinos to wear dinner jackets. See ante, at 337, n. 4. The Superior Court explained: "The classification that we do find suspicious, and which came to our attention during the course of this cause of action, ACAA v. Enrique Bird Pintero, C. A. 1984 Number 46, is the one made in section 4(e) of the Gaming Regulation (15 R. R. P. R. Sec. 76-a4[e]) requiring that the male tourist wear a jacket within the casino. On one hand, Puerto Rico is a tropical country. Adequate informal wear, such as the guayabera, is in tune with our climate and allows the tourist to enjoy himself without extreme, and in our judgment unconstitutional, restrictions on his stay on the Island. On the other hand, said requirement does not improve at all the elegant atmosphere that prevails in our casinos, since the male player may be forced to wear a horribly sewn jacket, so prepared to prevent people from taking them, which to a certain point is degrading for the man and discriminatory, since women are allowed into the casino without any type of requirement for formal wear. The Honorable Supreme Court in *Figueroa Ferrer*, [478 U.S. 328, 363] supra, stated: 'parliaments are not the only necessary agents of social change' and 'when you try to maintain a constitutional scheme alive, to preserve it in harmony with the realities of a country, the court's principal duty is to legislate towards that end, with the tranquility and circumspection which its role within our governmental system demands, without exceeding the framework of its jurisdiction.' To save the constitutionality of the Law under our consideration, we must bend the requirement of formal wear since this is basically a condition of sex and the State has no reasonable interest which would warrant a dissimilar classification." App. to Juris. Statement 35b-36b. Apparently, the Superior Court felt that Puerto Rico's unique brand of local censorship, like the guayabera, was "in tune" with Puerto Rico's climate; it is the obligation of this Court, however, to evaluate the regulations from a more universal perspective.

[[Footnote 3](#)] Moreover, the Court has relied on an inappropriate major premise. The fact that Puerto Rico might prohibit all casino gambling does not necessarily mean that it could prohibit residents from patronizing casinos that are open to tourists. Even under the Court's reasoning, discriminatory censorship cannot be justified as a less restrictive form of economic regulation unless discriminatory regulation is itself permissible. [478 U.S. 328, 364]

Questions

What is at issue in Posadas?

How does the court apply the Central Hudson test?

How does the court justify its opinion?

What is the apparent bright line rule presented by the opinion?

Is the court right?

EDGE BROADCASTING COURT OPINION

UNITED STATES and Federal Communications Commission, Petitioners,

v.

EDGE BROADCASTING COMPANY.

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 92-486.

Argued April 21, 1993.

Decided June 25, 1993.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-D.²

FN* In this case we must decide whether federal statutes that prohibit the broadcast of lottery advertising by a broadcaster licensed to a State that does not allow lotteries, while allowing such broadcasting by a broadcaster licensed to a State that sponsors a lottery, are, as applied to respondent, consistent with the First Amendment.

I

While lotteries have existed in this country since its founding, States have long viewed them as a hazard to their citizens and to the public interest, and have long engaged in legislative efforts to control this form of gambling. Congress has, since the early 19th century, sought to assist the States in controlling lotteries. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1827, § 6, 4 Stat. 238; Act of July 27, 1868, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196; Act of June 8, 1872, § 149, 17 Stat. 283, 302. In 1876, Congress made it a crime to deposit in the mails any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, whether illegal or chartered by state legislatures. See Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 2, 19 Stat. 90, codified at Rev.Stat. § 3894 (2d ed. 1878). This Court rejected a challenge to the 1876 Act on First Amendment grounds in *Ex parte Jackson*, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1878). In response to the persistence of lotteries, particularly the Louisiana Lottery, Congress closed a loophole allowing the advertisement of lotteries in newspapers in the Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465, codified at Supp. to Rev.Stat. § 3894 (2d ed. 1891), and this Court upheld that Act against a First Amendment challenge in *In re Rapier*, 143 U.S. 110, 12 S.Ct. 374, 36 L.Ed. 93 (1892). When the Louisiana Lottery moved its operations to Honduras, Congress passed the Act of Mar. 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 963, 18 U.S.C. § 1301, which outlawed the transportation of lottery tickets in interstate or foreign commerce. This Court upheld the constitutionality of that Act against a claim that it exceeded Congress' power under the Commerce Clause in *Lottery Case*, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct. 321, 47

² Justice O'CONNOR joins Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, and IV of this opinion. Justice SCALIA joins all but Part III-C of this opinion. Justice KENNEDY joins Parts I, II, III-C, and IV of this opinion. Justice SOUTER joins all but Parts III-A, III-B, and III-D of this opinion.

L.Ed. 492 (1903). This federal antilottery legislation remains in effect. See 18 U.S.C. § 1301, 1302.

After the advent of broadcasting, Congress extended the federal lottery control scheme by prohibiting, in § 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088, the broadcast of "any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme." 18 U.S.C. § 1304, as amended by the Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-625, § 3(a)(4), 102 Stat. 3206. [FN1] In 1975, Congress amended the statutory scheme to allow newspapers and broadcasters to advertise state-run lotteries if the newspaper is published in or the broadcast station is licensed to a State which conducts a state-run lottery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988 ed., Supp. III). [FN2] This exemption was enacted "to accommodate the operation of legally authorized State-run lotteries consistent with continued Federal protection to the policies of non-lottery States." S.Rep. No. 93-1404, p. 2 (1974). See also H.R.Rep. No. 93-1517, p. 5 (1974), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, p. 7007.

FN1. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988 ed., Supp. III) provides:

"Broadcasting lottery information

"Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which a license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."

FN2. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988 ed. and Supp. III) provides in relevant part:

"Exceptions relating to certain advertisements and other information and to State-conducted lotteries

"(a) The provisions of sections 1301, 1302, 1303, and 1304 shall not apply to-

"(1) an advertisement, list of prizes, or other information concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under the authority of State law which is-

"(A) contained in a publication published in that State or in a State which conducts such a lottery; or

"(B) broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that State or a State which conducts such a lottery; or

"(2) an advertisement, list of prizes, or other information concerning a lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, other than one described in paragraph (1), that is authorized or not otherwise prohibited by the State in which it is conducted and which is-

"(A) conducted by a not-for-profit organization or a governmental organization; or

"(B) conducted as a promotional activity by a commercial organization and is clearly occasional and ancillary to the primary business of that organization."

North Carolina does not sponsor a lottery, and participating in or advertising nonexempt raffles and lotteries is a crime under its statutes. N.C.Gen.Stat. § § 14-289 and 14-291 (1986 and Supp.1992). Virginia, on the other hand, has chosen to legalize lotteries under a state monopoly and has entered the marketplace vigorously.

Respondent, Edge Broadcasting Company (Edge), owns and operates a radio station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to Elizabeth City, North Carolina. This station, known as "Power 94," has the call letters WMYK-FM and broadcasts from Moyock, North Carolina, which is approximately three miles from the border between Virginia and North Carolina and considerably closer to Virginia than is Elizabeth City. Power 94 is one of 24 radio stations serving the Hampton Roads, Virginia, metropolitan area; 92.2% of its listening audience are Virginians; the rest, 7.8%, reside in the nine North Carolina counties served by Power 94. Because Edge is licensed to serve a North Carolina community, the federal statute prohibits it from broadcasting advertisements for the Virginia lottery. Edge derives 95% of its advertising revenue from Virginia sources, and claims that it has lost large sums of money from its inability to carry Virginia lottery advertisements.

Edge entered federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking a declaratory judgment that, as applied to it, § § 1304 and 1307, together with corresponding FCC regulations, violated the First Amendment to the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth, as well as injunctive protection against the enforcement of those statutes and regulations.

The District Court recognized that Congress has greater latitude to regulate broadcasting than other forms of communication. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a15a. The District Court construed the statutes not to cover the broadcast of noncommercial information about lotteries, a construction that the Government did not oppose. With regard to the restriction on advertising, the District Court evaluated the statutes under the established four-factor test for commercial speech set forth in *Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.*, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980):

"At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."

Assuming that the advertising Edge wished to air would deal with the Virginia lottery, a legal activity, and would not be misleading, the court went on to hold that the second and fourth Central Hudson factors were satisfied: the statutes were supported by a substantial governmental interest, and the restrictions were no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest, which was to discourage participating in lotteries in States that prohibited lotteries. The court held, however,

that the statutes, as applied to Edge, did not directly advance the asserted governmental interest, failed the Central Hudson test in this respect, and hence could not be constitutionally applied to Edge. A divided Court of Appeals, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, [FN3] affirmed in all respects, also rejecting the Government's submission that the District Court had erred in judging the validity of the statutes on an "as applied" standard, that is, determining whether the statutes directly served the governmental interest in a substantial way solely on the effect of applying them to Edge. Judgt. order reported at 956 F.2d 263 (CA4 1992).

FN3. We deem it remarkable and unusual that although the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion.

Because the court below declared a federal statute unconstitutional and applied reasoning that was questionable under our cases relating to the regulation of commercial speech, we granted certiorari. 506 U.S. 1032, 113 S.Ct. 809, 121 L.Ed.2d 683 (1992). We reverse.

II

The Government argues first that gambling implicates no constitutionally protected right, but rather falls within a category of activities normally considered to be "vices," and that the greater power to prohibit gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban its advertisement; it argues that we therefore need not proceed with a Central Hudson analysis. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue and neither do we, for the statutes are not unconstitutional under the standards of Central Hudson applied by the courts below.

III

For most of this Nation's history, purely commercial advertising was not considered to implicate the constitutional protection of the First Amendment. See *Valentine v. Chrestensen*, 316 U.S. 52, 54, 62 S.Ct. 920, 921, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942). In 1976, the Court extended First Amendment protection to speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction. See *Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). Our decisions, however, have recognized the "'common-sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech." *Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.*, 436 U.S. 447, 455-456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1918-1919, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). The Constitution therefore affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. *Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox*, 492 U.S. 469, 477, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3033, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989); *Central Hudson*, *supra*, 447 U.S., at 563, 100 S.Ct., at 2350; *Ohralik*, *supra*, 436 U.S., at 456, 98 S.Ct., at 1918.

In *Central Hudson*, we set out the general scheme for assessing government restrictions on commercial speech. *Supra*, 447 U.S., at 566, 100 S.Ct., at 2351. Like the courts below, we assume that Edge, if allowed to, would air nonmisleading advertisements about the Virginia lottery, a legal activity. As to the second Central

Hudson factor, we are quite sure that the Government has a substantial interest in supporting the policy of nonlottery States, as well as not interfering with the policy of States that permit lotteries. As in *Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P.R.*, 478 U.S. 328, 106 S.Ct. 2968, 92 L.Ed.2d 266 (1986), the activity underlying the relevant advertising--gambling--implicates no constitutionally protected right; rather, it falls into a category of "vice" activity that could be, and frequently has been, banned altogether. As will later be discussed, we also agree that the statutes are no broader than necessary to advance the Government's interest and hence the fourth part of the Central Hudson test is satisfied.

The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the District Court's holding that the statutes were invalid because, as applied to Edge, they failed to advance directly the governmental interest supporting them. According to the Court of Appeals, whose judgment we are reviewing, this was because the 127,000 people who reside in Edge's nine-county listening area in North Carolina receive most of their radio, newspaper, and television communications from Virginia-based media. These North Carolina residents who might listen to Edge "are inundated with Virginia's lottery advertisements" and hence, the court stated, prohibiting Edge from advertising Virginia's lottery "is ineffective in shielding North Carolina residents from lottery information." This "ineffective or remote measure to support North Carolina's desire to discourage gambling cannot justify infringement upon commercial free speech." App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a, 7a. In our judgment, the courts below erred in that respect.

A

The third Central Hudson factor asks whether the "regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted." 447 U.S., at 566, 100 S.Ct., at 2351. It is readily apparent that this question cannot be answered by limiting the inquiry to whether the governmental interest is directly advanced as applied to a single person or entity. Even if there were no advancement as applied in that manner--in this case, as applied to Edge--there would remain the matter of the regulation's general application to others--in this case, to all other radio and television stations in North Carolina and countrywide. The courts below thus asked the wrong question in ruling on the third Central Hudson factor. This is not to say that the validity of the statutes' application to Edge is an irrelevant inquiry, but that issue properly should be dealt with under the fourth factor of the Central Hudson test. As we have said, "[t]he last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends." *Posadas*, supra, 478 U.S., at 341, 106 S.Ct., at 2976.

We have no doubt that the statutes directly advanced the governmental interest at stake in this case. In response to the appearance of statesponsored lotteries, Congress might have continued to ban all radio or television lottery advertisements, even by stations in States that have legalized lotteries. This it did not do. Neither did it permit stations such as Edge, located in a non-lottery State, to carry lottery ads if their signals reached into a State that sponsors lotteries; similarly, it did not forbid stations in a lottery State such as Virginia from carrying lottery ads if their signals reached into an adjoining State such as North Carolina

where lotteries were illegal. Instead of favoring either the lottery or the nonlottery State, Congress opted to support the anti-gambling policy of a State like North Carolina by forbidding stations in such a State from airing lottery advertising. At the same time it sought not to unduly interfere with the policy of a lottery sponsoring State such as Virginia. Virginia could advertise its lottery through radio and television stations licensed to Virginia locations, even if their signals reached deep into North Carolina. Congress surely knew that stations in one State could often be heard in another but expressly prevented each and every North Carolina station, including Edge, from carrying lottery ads. Congress plainly made the commonsense judgment that each North Carolina station would have an audience in that State, even if its signal reached elsewhere and that enforcing the statutory restriction would insulate each station's listeners from lottery ads and hence advance the governmental purpose of supporting North Carolina's laws against gambling. This congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States is the substantial governmental interest that satisfies Central Hudson, the interest which the courts below did not fully appreciate. It is also the interest that is directly served by applying the statutory restriction to all stations in North Carolina; and this would plainly be the case even if, as applied to Edge, there were only marginal advancement of that interest.

B

Left unresolved, of course, is the validity of applying the statutory restriction to Edge, an issue that we now address under the fourth Central Hudson factor, i.e., whether the regulation is more extensive than is necessary to serve the governmental interest. We revisited that aspect of Central Hudson in *Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox*, 492 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989), and concluded that the validity of restrictions on commercial speech should not be judged by standards more stringent than those applied to expressive conduct entitled to full First Amendment protection or to relevant time, place, or manner restrictions. *Id.*, at 477-478, 109 S.Ct., at 3033-3034. We made clear in *Fox* that our commercial speech cases require a fit between the restriction and the government interest that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable. *Id.*, at 480, 109 S.Ct., at 3035. This was also the approach in *Posadas*, 478 U.S., at 344, 106 S.Ct., at 2978.

We have no doubt that the fit in this case was a reasonable one. Although Edge was licensed to serve the Elizabeth City area, it chose to broadcast from a more northerly position, which allowed its signal to reach into the Hampton Roads, Virginia, metropolitan area. Allowing it to carry lottery ads reaching over 90% of its listeners, all in Virginia, would surely enhance its revenues. But just as surely, because Edge's signals with lottery ads would be heard in the nine counties in North Carolina that its broadcasts reached, this would be in derogation of the substantial federal interest in supporting North Carolina's laws making lotteries illegal. In this posture, to prevent Virginia's lottery policy from dictating what stations in a neighboring State may air, it is reasonable to require Edge to comply with the restriction against carrying lottery advertising. In other words, applying the restriction to a broadcaster such as Edge directly advances the governmental interest in enforcing the restriction in nonlottery States, while not interfering with

the policy of lottery States like Virginia. We think this would be the case even if it were true, which it is not, that applying the general statutory restriction to Edge, in isolation, would no more than marginally insulate the North Carolinians in the North Carolina counties served by Edge from hearing lottery ads.

In *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), we dealt with a time, place, or manner restriction that required the city to control the sound level of musical concerts in a city park, concerts that were fully protected by the First Amendment. We held there that the requirement of narrow tailoring was met if "the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation," provided that it did not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. *Id.*, at 799, 109 S.Ct., at 2758 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the course of upholding the restriction, we went on to say that "the validity of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the government's interest in an individual case." *Id.*, at 801, 109 S.Ct., at 2759.

The *Ward* holding is applicable here, for we have observed that the validity of time, place, or manner restrictions is determined under standards very similar to those applicable in the commercial speech context and that it would be incompatible with the subordinate position of commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values to apply a more rigid standard to commercial speech than is applied to fully protected speech. *Fox, supra*, 492 U.S., at 477, 478, 109 S.Ct., at 3033. *Ward* thus teaches us that we judge the validity of the restriction in this case by the relation it bears to the general problem of accommodating the policies of both lottery and nonlottery States, not by the extent to which it furthers the Government's interest in an individual case.

This is consistent with the approach we have taken in the commercial speech context. In *Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.*, 436 U.S., at 462, 98 S.Ct., at 1921, for example, an attorney attacked the validity of a rule against solicitation "not facially, but as applied to his acts of solicitation." We rejected the appellant's view that his "as applied" challenge required the State to show that his particular conduct in fact trespassed on the interests that the regulation sought to protect. We stated that in the general circumstances of the appellant's acts, the State had "a strong interest in adopting and enforcing rules of conduct designed to protect the public." *Id.*, at 464, 98 S.Ct., at 1923. This having been established, the State was entitled to protect its interest by applying a prophylactic rule to those circumstances generally; we declined to require the State to go further and to prove that the state interests supporting the rule actually were advanced by applying the rule in *Ohralik's* particular case.

Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993), is not to the contrary. While treating *Fane's* claim as an as applied challenge to a broad category of commercial solicitation, we did not suggest that *Fane* could challenge the regulation on commercial speech as applied only to himself or his own acts of solicitation.

C

We also believe that the courts below were wrong in holding that as applied to Edge itself, the restriction at issue was ineffective and gave only remote support to the Government's interest.

As we understand it, both the Court of Appeals and the District Court recognized that Edge's potential North Carolina audience was the 127,000 residents of nine North Carolina counties, that enough of them regularly or from time to time listen to Edge to account for 11% of all radio listening in those counties, and that while listening to Edge they heard no lottery advertisements. It could hardly be denied, and neither court below purported to deny, that these facts, standing alone, would clearly show that applying the statutory restriction to Edge would directly serve the statutory purpose of supporting North Carolina's antigambling policy by excluding invitations to gamble from 11% of the radio listening time in the nine-county area. Without more, this result could hardly be called either "ineffective," "remote," or "conditional," see *Central Hudson*, 447 U.S., at 564, 569, 100 S.Ct., at 2350, 2353. Nor could it be called only "limited incremental support," *Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.*, 463 U.S. 60, 73, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2884, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983), for the Government interest, or thought to furnish only speculative or marginal support. App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a, 25a. Otherwise, any North Carolina radio station with 127,000 or fewer potential listeners would be permitted to carry lottery ads because of its marginal significance in serving the State's interest.

Of course, both courts below pointed out, and rested their judgment on the fact, that the 127,000 people in North Carolina who might listen to Edge also listened to Virginia radio stations and television stations that regularly carried lottery ads. Virginia newspapers carrying such material also were available to them. This exposure, the courts below thought, was sufficiently pervasive to prevent the restriction on Edge from furnishing any more than ineffective or remote support for the statutory purpose. We disagree with this conclusion because in light of the facts relied on, it represents too limited a view of what amounts to direct advancement of the governmental interest that is present in this case.

Even if all of the residents of Edge's North Carolina service area listen to lottery ads from Virginia stations, it would still be true that 11% of radio listening time in that area would remain free of such material. If Edge is allowed to advertise the Virginia lottery, the percentage of listening time carrying such material would increase from 38% to 49%. We do not think that *Central Hudson* compels us to consider this consequence to be without significance.

The Court of Appeals indicated that Edge's potential audience of 127,000 persons were "inundated" by the Virginia media carrying lottery advertisements. But the District Court found that only 38% of all radio listening in the nine-county area was directed at stations that broadcast lottery advertising. [FN4] With respect to television, the District Court observed that American adults spend 60% of their media consumption time listening to television. The evidence before it also indicated that in four of the nine counties served by Edge, 75% of all television viewing was directed at Virginia stations; in three others, the figure was between 50

and 75%; and in the remaining two counties, between 25 and 50%. Even if it is assumed that all of these stations carry lottery advertising, it is very likely that a great many people in the nine-county area are exposed to very little or no lottery advertising carried on television. Virginia newspapers are also circulated in Edge's area, 10,400 daily and 12,500 on Sundays, hardly enough to constitute a pervasive exposure to lottery advertising, even on the unlikely assumption that the readers of those newspapers always look for and read the lottery ads. Thus the District Court observed only that "a significant number of residents of [the nine-county] area listens to" Virginia radio and television stations and read Virginia newspapers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a (emphasis added).

FN4. It would appear, then, that 51% of the radio listening time in the relevant nine counties is attributable to other North Carolina stations or other stations not carrying lottery advertising.

Moreover, to the extent that the courts below assumed that § § 1304 and 1307 would have to effectively shield North Carolina residents from information about lotteries to advance their purpose, they were mistaken. As the Government asserts, the statutes were not "adopt[ed] ... to keep North Carolina residents ignorant of the Virginia Lottery for ignorance's sake," but to accommodate non-lottery States' interest in discouraging public participation in lotteries, even as they accommodate the countervailing interests of lottery States. Reply Brief for Petitioners 11. Within the bounds of the general protection provided by the Constitution to commercial speech, we allow room for legislative judgments. *Fox*, 492 U.S., at 480, 109 S.Ct., at 3034. Here, as in *Posadas de Puerto Rico*, the Government obviously legislated on the premise that the advertising of gambling serves to increase the demand for the advertised product. See *Posadas*, 478 U.S., at 344, 106 S.Ct., at 2978. See also *Central Hudson*, *supra*, 447 U.S., at 569, 100 S.Ct., at 2353. Congress clearly was entitled to determine that broadcast of promotional advertising of lotteries undermines North Carolina's policy against gambling, even if the North Carolina audience is not wholly unaware of the lottery's existence. Congress has, for example, altogether banned the broadcast advertising of cigarettes, even though it could hardly have believed that this regulation would keep the public wholly ignorant of the availability of cigarettes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335. See also *Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n*, 69 Ohio St.2d 361, 366, 433 N.E.2d 138, 142 (alcohol advertising), app. dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 807, 103 S.Ct. 31, 74 L.Ed.2d 45 (1982). Nor do we require that the Government make progress on every front before it can make progress on any front. If there is an immediate connection between advertising and demand, and the federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of decreasing demand for gambling is correspondingly advanced. Accordingly, the Government may be said to advance its purpose by substantially reducing lottery advertising, even where it is not wholly eradicated.

Thus, even if it were proper to conduct a *Central Hudson* analysis of the statutes only as applied to Edge, we would not agree with the courts below that the restriction at issue here, which prevents Edge from broadcasting lottery advertising to its sizable radio audience in North Carolina, is rendered ineffective by the fact

that Virginia radio and television programs can be heard in North Carolina. In our view, the restriction, even as applied only to Edge, directly advances the governmental interest within the meaning of Central Hudson.

D

Nor need we be blind to the practical effect of adopting respondent's view of the level of particularity of analysis appropriate to decide its case. Assuming for the sake of argument that Edge had a valid claim that the statutes violated Central Hudson only as applied to it, the piecemeal approach it advocates would act to vitiate the Government's ability generally to accommodate States with differing policies. Edge has chosen to transmit from a location near the border between two jurisdictions with different rules, and rests its case on the spillover from the jurisdiction across the border. Were we to adopt Edge's approach, we would treat a station that is close to the line as if it were on the other side of it, effectively extending the legal regime of Virginia inside North Carolina. One result of holding for Edge on this basis might well be that additional North Carolina communities, farther from the Virginia border, would receive broadcast lottery advertising from Edge. Broadcasters licensed to these communities, as well as other broadcasters serving Elizabeth City, would then be able to complain that lottery advertising from Edge and other similar broadcasters renders the federal statute ineffective as applied to them. Because the approach Edge advocates has no logical stopping point once state boundaries are ignored, this process might be repeated until the policy of supporting North Carolina's ban on lotteries would be seriously eroded. We are unwilling to start down that road.

IV

Because the statutes challenged here regulate commercial speech in a manner that does not violate the First Amendment, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.

Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice KENNEDY joins, concurring in part.

I agree with the Court that the restriction at issue here is constitutional, under our decision in *Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.*, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), even if that restriction is judged "as applied to Edge itself." Ante, at 2706. I accordingly believe it unnecessary to decide whether the restriction might appropriately be reviewed at a more lenient level of generality, and I take no position on that question.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BLACKMUN joins, dissenting.

Three months ago this Court reaffirmed that the proponents of a restriction on commercial speech bear the burden of demonstrating a "reasonable fit" between the legislature's goals and the means chosen to effectuate those goals. See *Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.*, 507 U.S. 410, 416, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1510, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). While the "'fit'" between means and ends need not be perfect, an infringement on constitutionally protected speech must be "'in proportion to the interest served.'" Id., at 417, n. 12, 113 S.Ct., at 1510, n. 12 (quoting *Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox*, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3035, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989)). In my opinion, the Federal Government's selective ban on

lottery advertising unquestionably flunks that test; for the means chosen by the Government, a ban on speech imposed for the purpose of manipulating public behavior, is in no way proportionate to the Federal Government's asserted interest in protecting the antilottery policies of nonlottery States. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

As the Court acknowledges, the United States does not assert a general interest in restricting state-run lotteries. Indeed, it could not, as it has affirmatively removed restrictions on use of the airwaves and mails for the promotion of such lotteries. See ante, at 2701. Rather, the federal interest in this case is entirely derivative. By tying the right to broadcast advertising regarding a state-run lottery to whether the State in which the broadcaster is located itself sponsors a lottery, Congress sought to support nonlottery States in their efforts to "discourag[e] public participation in lotteries." Ante, at 2701, 2707. [FN1]

FN1. At one point in its opinion, the Court identifies the relevant federal interest as "supporting North Carolina's laws making lotteries illegal." Ante, at 2705. Of course, North Carolina law does not, and, presumably, could not, bar its citizens from traveling across the state line and participating in the Virginia lottery. North Carolina law does not make the Virginia lottery illegal. I take the Court to mean that North Carolina's decision not to institute a state-run lottery reflects its policy judgment that participation in such lotteries, even those conducted by another State, is detrimental to the public welfare, and that 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988 ed. and Supp. III) represents a federal effort to respect that policy judgment.

Even assuming that nonlottery States desire such assistance from the Federal Government--an assumption that must be made without any supporting evidence--I would hold that suppressing truthful advertising regarding a neighboring State's lottery, an activity which is, of course, perfectly legal, is a patently unconstitutional means of effectuating the Government's asserted interest in protecting the policies of nonlottery States. Indeed, I had thought that we had so held almost two decades ago.

In *Bigelow v. Virginia*, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), this Court recognized that a State had a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens as they ventured outside the State's borders. *Id.*, at 824, 95 S.Ct., at 2234. We flatly rejected the notion, however, that a State could effectuate that interest by suppressing truthful, nonmisleading information regarding a legal activity in another State. We held that a State "may not, under the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that State." *Id.*, at 824-825, 95 S.Ct., at 2234. To be sure, the advertising in *Bigelow* related to abortion, a constitutionally protected right, and the Court in *Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P.R.*, 478 U.S. 328, 106 S.Ct. 2968, 92 L.Ed.2d 266 (1986), relied on that fact in dismissing the force of our holding in that case, see *id.*, at 345, 106 S.Ct., at 2979. But even a casual reading of *Bigelow* demonstrates that the case cannot fairly be read so narrowly. The fact that the information in the advertisement related to abortion was only one factor informing the Court's determination that there were substantial First Amendment

interests at stake in the State's attempt to suppress truthful advertising about a legal activity in another State:

"Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience--not only to readers possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State and its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia. The mere existence of the [organization advertising abortion-related services] in New York City, with the possibility of its being typical of other organizations there, and the availability of the services offered, were not unnewsworthy. Also the activity advertised pertained to constitutional interests." *Bigelow*, 421 U.S., at 822, 95 S.Ct., at 2232. [FN2]

FN2. The analogy to *Bigelow* and this case is even closer than one might think. The North Carolina General Assembly is currently considering whether to institute a state-operated lottery. See 1993 N.C.S. Bill No. 11, 140th Gen. Assembly. As with the advertising at issue in *Bigelow*, then, advertising relating to the Virginia lottery may be of interest to those in North Carolina who are currently debating whether that State should join the ranks of the growing number of States that sponsor a lottery. See *infra*, at ----.

Bigelow is not about a woman's constitutionally protected right to terminate a pregnancy. [FN3] It is about paternalism, and informational protectionism. It is about one State's interference with its citizens' fundamental constitutional right to travel in a state of enlightenment, not government-induced ignorance. Cf. *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-1330, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). [FN4] I would reaffirm this basic First Amendment principle. In seeking to assist nonlottery States in their efforts to shield their citizens from the perceived dangers emanating from a neighboring State's lottery, the Federal Government has not regulated the content of such advertisements to ensure that they are not misleading, nor has it provided for the distribution of more speech, such as warnings or educational information about gambling. Rather, the United States has selected the most intrusive, and dangerous, form of regulation possible--a ban on truthful information regarding a lawful activity imposed for the purpose of manipulating, through ignorance, the consumer choices of some of its citizens. Unless justified by a truly substantial governmental interest, this extreme, and extremely paternalistic, measure surely cannot withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment.

FN3. If anything, the fact that underlying conduct is not constitutionally protected increases, not decreases, the value of unfettered exchange of information across state lines. When a State has proscribed a certain product or service, its citizens are all the more dependent on truthful information regarding the policies and practices of other States. Cf. *Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic*, 506 U.S. 263, 332, n. 31, 113 S.Ct. 753, 792, n. 31, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The alternative is to view individuals as more in the nature of captives of their respective States than as free citizens of a larger polity.

FN4. "For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United

States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States." Passenger Cases, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 283, 492, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849).

No such interest is asserted in this case. With barely a whisper of analysis, the Court concludes that a State's interest in discouraging lottery participation by its citizens is surely "substantial"--a necessary prerequisite to sustain a restriction on commercial speech, see *Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.*, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980)--because gambling "falls into a category of 'vice' activity that could be, and frequently has been, banned altogether," ante, at 2703.

I disagree. While a State may indeed have an interest in discouraging its citizens from participating in state-run lotteries, [FN5] it does not necessarily follow that its interest is "substantial" enough to justify an infringement on constitutionally protected speech, [FN6] especially one as draconian as the regulation at issue in this case. In my view, the sea change in public attitudes toward state-run lotteries that this country has witnessed in recent years undermines any claim that a State's interest in discouraging its citizens from participating in state-run lotteries is so substantial as to outweigh respondent's First Amendment right to distribute, and the public's right to receive, truthful, nonmisleading information about a perfectly legal activity conducted in a neighboring State.

FN5. A State might reasonably conclude, for example, that lotteries play on the hopes of those least able to afford to purchase lottery tickets, and that its citizens would be better served by spending their money on more promising investments. The fact that I happen to share these concerns regarding state-sponsored lotteries is, of course, irrelevant to the proper analysis of the legal issue.

FN6. See, e.g., *Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.*, 507 U.S. 410, 417, n. 13, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1510, n. 13, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (noting that restrictions on commercial speech are subject to more searching scrutiny than mere "rational basis" review).

While the Court begins its opinion with a discussion of the federal and state efforts in the 19th century to restrict lotteries, it largely ignores the fact that today hostility to state-run lotteries is the exception rather than the norm. Thirty-four States and the District of Columbia now sponsor a lottery. [FN7] Three more States will initiate lotteries this year. [FN8] Of the remaining 13 States, at least 5 States have recently considered or are currently considering establishing a lottery. [FN9] In fact, even the State of North Carolina, whose antilottery policies the Federal Government's advertising ban are purportedly buttressing in this case, is considering establishing a lottery. See 1993 N.C.S. Bill No. 11, 140th Gen. Assembly. According to one estimate, by the end of this decade all but two States (Utah and Nevada) will have state-run lotteries. [FN10]

FN7. Selinger, *Special Report: Marketing State Lotteries*, City and State 14 (May 24, 1993).

FN8. *Ibid.*

FN9. See, e.g., 1993 Ala.H. Bill No. 75, 165th Legislature--Regular Sess.; 1993 Miss.S.Concurrent Res. No. 566, 162d Legislature--Regular Sess.; 1993 N.M.S. Bill No. 141, 41st Legislature--First Regular Sess.; 1993 N.C.S. Bill No. 11, 140th Gen. Assembly; 1993 Okla.H.Bill No. 1348, 44th Legislature--First Regular Sess.

FN10. Selinger, *supra*.

The fact that the vast majority of the States currently sponsor a lottery, and that soon virtually all of them will do so, does not, of course, preclude an outlier State from following a different course and attempting to discourage its citizens from partaking of such activities. But just as the fact that "the vast majority of the 50 States ... prohibit[ed] casino gambling" purported to inform the Court's conclusion in *Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P.R.*, 478 U.S., at 341, 106 S.Ct., at 2976, that Puerto Rico had a "substantial" interest in discouraging such gambling, the national trend in the opposite direction in this case surely undermines the United States' contention that nonlottery States have a "substantial" interest in discouraging their citizens from traveling across state lines and participating in a neighboring State's lottery. The Federal Government and the States simply do not have an overriding or "substantial" interest in seeking to discourage what virtually the entire country is embracing, and certainly not an interest that can justify a restriction on constitutionally protected speech as sweeping as the one the Court today sustains.

I respectfully dissent.

Questions

What are the facts of Edge?

How does the prevailing opinion treat Edge?

Is Edge compatible with Posadas?

44 LIQUORMART COURT OPINION

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 94–1140

44 LIQUORMART, INC. AND PEOPLES SUPER
LIQUOR STORES, INC., PETITIONERS *v.*
RHODE ISLAND AND RHODE ISLAND
LIQUOR STORES ASSOCIATION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[May 13, 1996]

JUSTICE STEVENS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, VII, and VIII, an opinion with respect to Parts III and V, in which JUSTICE KENNEDY, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, an opinion with respect to Part VI, in which JUSTICE KENNEDY, JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which JUSTICE KENNEDY and JUSTICE GINSBURG join.

Last Term we held that a federal law abridging a brewer's right to provide the public with accurate information about the alcoholic content of malt beverages is unconstitutional. *Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.*, 514 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 14). We now hold that Rhode Island's statutory prohibition against advertisements that provide the public with accurate information about retail prices of alcoholic beverages is also invalid. Our holding rests on the conclusion that such an advertising ban is an abridgment of speech protected by the First Amendment and that it is not shielded from constitutional scrutiny by the Twenty-first Amendment.³

³Although the text of the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” the Amendment

In 1956, the Rhode Island Legislature enacted two separate prohibitions against advertising the retail price of alcoholic beverages. The first applies to vendors licensed in Rhode Island as well as to out-of-state manufacturers, wholesalers, and shippers. It prohibits them from “advertising in any manner whatsoever” the price of any alcoholic beverage offered for sale in the State; the only exception is for price tags or signs displayed with the merchandise within licensed premises and not visible from the street.⁴ The second statute applies to the Rhode Island news media. It contains a categorical prohibition against the publication or broadcast of any advertisements—even those referring to sales in other States—that “make reference to the price of any alcoholic beverages.”⁵

applies to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See *Board of Ed., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico*, 457 U. S. 853, 855, n. 1 (1982); *Grosjean v. American Press Co.*, 297 U. S. 233, 244 (1936); *Gitlow v. New York*, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925).

⁴Rhode Island Gen. Laws §3–8–7 (1987) provides:

“Advertising price of malt beverages, cordials, wine or distilled liquor.—No manufacturer, wholesaler, or shipper from without this state and no holder of a license issued under the provisions of this title and chapter shall cause or permit the advertising in any manner whatsoever of the price of any malt beverage, cordials, wine or distilled liquor offered for sale in this state; provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to price signs or tags attached to or placed on merchandise for sale within the licensed premises in accordance with rules and regulations of the department.”

Regulation 32 of the Rules and Regulations of the Liquor Control Administrator provides that no placard or sign that is visible from the exterior of a package store may make any reference to the price of any alcoholic beverage. App. 2 to Brief for Petitioners.

⁵Rhode Island Gen. Laws §3–8–8.1 (1987) provides:

“Price advertising by media or advertising companies unlawful.—No newspaper, periodical, radio or television broadcaster or broadcasting company or any other person, firm or corporation with a principal place of business in the state of Rhode Island which is engaged in the business of advertising or selling advertising time or space shall accept, publish, or broadcast any advertisement in this state of the price or make reference to the price of any alcoholic beverages. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor” The statute

In two cases decided in 1985, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of these two statutes. In *S&S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore*, 497 A. 2d 729 (R. I.), a liquor retailer located in Westerly, Rhode Island, a town that borders the State of Connecticut, having been advised that his license would be revoked if he advertised his prices in a Connecticut paper, sought to enjoin enforcement of the first statute. Over the dissent of one Justice, the court upheld the statute. It concluded that the statute served the substantial state interest in “the promotion of temperance.”⁶ *Id.*, at 737. Because the plaintiff failed to prove that the statute did not serve that interest, the court held that he had not carried his burden of establishing a violation of the First Amendment. In response to the dissent's argument that the court had placed the burden on the wrong party, the majority reasoned that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the statute “an added presumption [of] validity.” *S&S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore*, 497 A. 2d, at 732. Although that presumption had not been overcome in that case, the State Supreme Court assumed that in a future case the record might “support the proposition that

authorizes the liquor control administrator to exempt trade journals from its coverage. *Ibid.*

⁶“We also have little difficulty in finding that the asserted governmental interests, herein described as the promotion of temperance and the reasonable control of the traffic in alcoholic beverages, are substantial. We note, parenthetically, that the word ‘temperance’ is oftentimes mistaken as a synonym for ‘abstinence.’ It is not. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961) defines ‘temperance’ as ‘moderation in or abstinence from the use of intoxicating drink.’ The Rhode Island Legislature has the authority, derived from the state's inherent police power, to enact a variety of laws designed to suppress intemperance or to minimize the acknowledged evils of liquor traffic. Thus, there can be no question that these asserted interests are indeed substantial. *Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp*, 699 F. 2d at 500.” *S&S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore*, 497 A. 2d, at 733–734.

In her dissent in *Rhode Island Liquor Stores Assn. v. Evening Call Pub. Co.*, 497 A. 2d 331 (R. I. 1985), Justice Murray suggested that the advertising ban was motivated, at least in part, by an interest in protecting small retailers from price competition. *Id.*, at 342, n. 10. This suggestion is consistent with the position taken by respondent Rhode Island Liquor Stores Association in this case. We, however, accept the State Supreme Court's identification of the relevant state interest served by the legislation.

these advertising restrictions do not further temperance objectives.” *Id.*, at 734.

In *Rhode Island Liquor Stores Assn. v. Evening Call Pub. Co.*, 497 A. 2d 331 (R. I. 1985), the plaintiff association⁷ sought to enjoin the publisher of the local newspaper in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, from accepting advertisements disclosing the retail price of alcoholic beverages being sold across the state line in Millville, Massachusetts. In upholding the injunction, the State Supreme Court adhered to its reasoning in the *Pastore* case and rejected the argument that the statute neither “directly advanced” the state interest in promoting temperance, nor was “more extensive than necessary to serve that interest” as required by this Court’s decision in *Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y.*, 447 U. S. 557, 563 (1980). It assumed the existence of other, “perhaps more effective means” of achieving the State’s “goal of temperance”, but concluded that it was “not unreasonable for the State of Rhode Island to believe that price advertising will result in increased sales of alcoholic beverages generally.” *Rhode Island Liquor Stores Assn. v. Evening Call Pub. Co.*, 497 A. 2d, at 336.

I

Petitioners 44 Liquormart, Inc. (44 Liquormart), and Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc. (Peoples), are licensed retailers of alcoholic beverages. Petitioner 44 Liquormart operates a store in Rhode Island and petitioner Peoples operates several stores in Massachusetts that are patronized by Rhode Island residents. Peoples uses alcohol price advertising extensively in Massachusetts, where such advertising is permitted, but Rhode Island newspapers and other media outlets have refused to accept such ads.

Complaints from competitors about an advertisement placed by 44 Liquormart in a Rhode Island newspaper in 1991 generated enforcement proceedings that in turn led to the initiation of this litigation. The advertisement did not state the price of any alcoholic beverages. Indeed, it noted that “State law prohibits advertising liquor prices.”

⁷The plaintiff in that case is a respondent in this case and has filed other actions enforcing the price advertising ban. See *id.*, at 333.

The ad did, however, state the low prices at which peanuts, potato chips, and Schweppes mixers were being offered, identify various brands of packaged liquor, and include the word “WOW” in large letters next to pictures of vodka and rum bottles. Based on the conclusion that the implied reference to bargain prices for liquor violated the statutory ban on price advertising, the Rhode Island Liquor Control Administrator assessed a \$400 fine.

After paying the fine, 44 Liquormart, joined by Peoples, filed this action against the administrator in the Federal District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the two statutes and the administrator's implementing regulations violate the First Amendment and other provisions of federal law. The Rhode Island Liquor Stores Association was allowed to intervene as a defendant and in due course the State of Rhode Island replaced the administrator as the principal defendant. The parties stipulated that the price advertising ban is vigorously enforced, that Rhode Island permits “all advertising of alcoholic beverages excepting references to price outside the licensed premises,” and that petitioners' proposed ads do not concern an illegal activity and presumably would not be false or misleading. *44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine*, 829 F. Supp. 543, 545 (R. I. 1993). The parties disagreed, however, about the impact of the ban on the promotion of temperance in Rhode Island. On that question the District Court heard conflicting expert testimony and reviewed a number of studies.

In his findings of fact, the District Judge first noted that there was a pronounced lack of unanimity among researchers who have studied the impact of advertising on the level of consumption of alcoholic beverages. He referred to a 1985 Federal Trade Commission study that found no evidence that alcohol advertising significantly affects alcohol abuse. Another study indicated that Rhode Island ranks in the upper 30% of States in per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages; alcohol consumption is lower in other States that allow price advertising. After summarizing the testimony of the expert witnesses for both parties, he found “as a fact that Rhode Island's off-premises liquor price advertising ban has no significant impact on levels of alcohol consumption in Rhode Island.” *Id.*, at 549.

As a matter of law, he concluded that the price advertising ban was unconstitutional because it did not “directly advance” the State’s interest in reducing alcohol consumption and was “more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.” *Id.*, at 555. He reasoned that the party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it and that the Twenty-first Amendment did not shift or diminish that burden. Acknowledging that it might have been reasonable for the state legislature to “assume a correlation between the price advertising ban and reduced consumption,” he held that more than a rational basis was required to justify the speech restriction, and that the State had failed to demonstrate a reasonable “fit” between its policy objectives and its chosen means. *Ibid.*

The Court of Appeals reversed. It found “inherent merit” in the State’s submission that competitive price advertising would lower prices and that lower prices would produce more sales. 39 F. 3d 5, 7 (CA1 1994). Moreover, it agreed with the reasoning of the Rhode Island Supreme Court that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the statutes an added presumption of validity. *Id.*, at 8. Alternatively, it concluded that reversal was compelled by this Court’s summary action in *Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n of Ohio*, 459 U. S. 807 (1982). See 39 F. 3d, at 8. In that case the Court dismissed the appeal from a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court upholding a prohibition against off-premises advertising of the prices of alcoholic beverages sold by the drink. See *Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n of Ohio*, 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N. E. 2d 138 (1982).

Queensgate has been both followed and distinguished in subsequent cases reviewing the validity of similar advertising bans.⁸ We are

⁸In *Dunagin v. Oxford*, 718 F. 2d 738 (CA5 1983), the Fifth Circuit distinguished our summary action in *Queensgate* in considering the constitutionality of a sweeping state restriction on outdoor liquor advertising. The Court explained that *Queensgate* did not control because it involved a far narrower alcohol advertising regulation. *Id.*, at 745–746. By contrast, in *Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp*, 699 F. 2d 490, 495–497 (CA10 1983), rev’d on other grounds *sub nom.*, *Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp*, 467 U. S.

now persuaded that the importance of the First Amendment issue, as well the suggested relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment, merits more thorough analysis than it received when we refused to accept jurisdiction of the *Queensgate* appeal. We therefore granted certiorari. 514 U. S. ___ (1995).

II

Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in colonial days, the public relied on “commercial speech” for vital information about the market. Early newspapers displayed advertisements for goods and services on their front pages, and town criers called out prices in public squares. See J. Wood, *The Story of Advertising* 21, 45–69, 85 (1958); J. Smith, *Printers and Press Freedom* 49 (1988). Indeed, commercial messages played such a central role in public life prior to the Founding that Benjamin Franklin authored his early defense of a free press in support of his decision to print, of all things, an advertisement for voyages to Barbados. Franklin, *An Apology for Printers*, June 10, 1731, reprinted in *2 Writings of Benjamin Franklin* 172 (1907).

In accord with the role that commercial messages have long played, the law has developed to ensure that advertising provides consumers with accurate information about the availability of goods and services. In the early years, the common law, and later, statutes, served

691, 697 (1984), the Tenth Circuit relied on *Queensgate* in considering a prohibition against broadcasting alcohol advertisements. The Court of Appeals concluded that *Queensgate* stood for the proposition that the Twenty-first Amendment gives the State greater authority to regulate liquor advertising than the First Amendment would otherwise allow. 699 F. 2d, at 495–497.

Other than the two Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions upholding the constitutionality of the statutes at issue in this case, only one published state court opinion has considered our summary action in *Queensgate* in passing on a liquor advertising restriction. See *Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Assn. v. Attorney General*, 142 Mich. App. 294, 370 N. W. 2d 328 (1985). There, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that *Queensgate* did not control because it involved a far narrower restriction on liquor advertising than the one that Michigan had imposed. 142 Mich. App., at 304–305, 370 N. W. 2d, at 333–335.

the consumers' interest in the receipt of accurate information in the commercial market by prohibiting fraudulent and misleading advertising. It was not until the 1970's, however, that this Court held that the First Amendment protected the dissemination of truthful and nonmisleading commercial messages about lawful products and services. See generally Kozinski & Banner, *The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech*, 71 *Texas L. Rev.* 747 (1993).

In *Bigelow v. Virginia*, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), we held that it was error to assume that commercial speech was entitled to no First Amendment protection or that it was without value in the marketplace of ideas. *Id.*, at 825–826. The following Term in *Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), we expanded on our holding in *Bigelow* and held that the State's blanket ban on advertising the price of prescription drugs violated the First Amendment.

Virginia Pharmacy Bd. reflected the conclusion that the same interest that supports regulation of potentially misleading advertising, namely the public's interest in receiving accurate commercial information, also supports an interpretation of the First Amendment that provides constitutional protection for the dissemination of accurate and nonmisleading commercial messages. We explained:

“Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.” *Id.*, at 765.⁹

⁹By contrast, the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech about unlawful activities. See *Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations*, 413 U. S. 376 (1973).

The opinion further explained that a State's paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it:

“There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them. If they are truly open, nothing prevents the ‘professional’ pharmacist from marketing his own assertedly superior product, and contrasting it with that of the low-cost, high-volume prescription drug retailer. But the choice among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly’s. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.” *Id.* at 770.

On the basis of these principles, our early cases uniformly struck down several broadly based bans on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech, each of which served ends unrelated to consumer protection.¹⁰ Indeed, one of those cases expressly likened the rationale that *Virginia Pharmacy Bd.* employed to the one that Justice Brandeis adopted in his concurrence in *Whitney v. California*, 274 U. S. 357 (1927). See *Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro*, 431 U. S. 85, 97 (1977). There, Justice Brandeis wrote, in explaining his objection to a prohibition of *political* speech, that “the remedy to

¹⁰See *Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.*, 433 U. S. 350, 355 (1977) (ban on lawyer advertising); *Carey v. Population Services Int’l*, 431 U. S. 678, 700 (1977) (ban on contraceptive advertising); *Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro*, 431 U. S. 85, 92–94 (1977) (ban on ‘For Sale’ signs); *Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U. S. 748 (1976) (ban on prescription drug prices); *Bigelow v. Virginia*, 421 U. S. 809, 825 (1975) (ban on abortion advertising). Although *Linmark* involved a prohibition against a particular means of advertising the sale of one’s home, we treated the restriction as if it were a complete ban because it did not leave open “satisfactory” alternative channels of communication. 431 U. S., at 92–94.

be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.” *Whitney*, 274 U. S., at 377; see also *Carey v. Population Services Int’l*, 431 U. S. 678, 701 (1977) (applying test for suppressing political speech set forth in *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969)).

At the same time, our early cases recognized that the State may regulate some types of commercial advertising more freely than other forms of protected speech. Specifically, we explained that the State may require commercial messages to “appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive,” *Virginia Pharmacy Bd.*, 425 U. S., at 772, n. 24, and that it may restrict some forms of aggressive sales practices that have the potential to exert “undue influence” over consumers. See *Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.*, 433 U. S. 350, 366 (1977).

Virginia Pharmacy Bd. attributed the State’s authority to impose these regulations in part to certain “commonsense differences” that exist between commercial messages and other types of protected expression. 425 U. S., at 771, n. 24. Our opinion noted that the greater “objectivity” of commercial speech justifies affording the State more freedom to distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones, *ibid.* and that the greater “hardiness” of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the profit motive, likely diminishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation, *ibid.*

Subsequent cases explained that the State’s power to regulate commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial speech that is “linked inextricably” to those transactions. *Friedman v. Rogers*, 440 U. S. 1, 10, n. 9 (1979); *Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.*, 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech “occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation . . .”). As one commentator has explained: “The entire commercial speech doctrine, after all, represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear expression *about* goods and services and the right of government to regulate the sales *of* such goods and services.” L. Tribe, *American Constitutional Law* §12–15, p. 903 (2d ed. 1988). Nevertheless, as we explained in

Linmark, the State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at “the substance of the information communicated” rather than the “commercial aspect of [it]—with offerors communicating offers to offerees.” See *Linmark* 431 U. S., at 96; *Carey v. Population Services Int’l*, 431 U. S. 678, 701, n. 28 (1977).

In *Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y.*, 447 U. S. 557 (1980), we took stock of our developing commercial speech jurisprudence. In that case, we considered a regulation “completely” banning all promotional advertising by electric utilities. *Ibid.* Our decision acknowledged the special features of commercial speech but identified the serious First Amendment concerns that attend blanket advertising prohibitions that do not protect consumers from commercial harms.

Five Members of the Court recognized that the state interest in the conservation of energy was substantial, and that there was “an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity.” *Id.*, at 569. Nevertheless, they concluded that the regulation was invalid because the Commission had failed to make a showing that a more limited speech regulation would not have adequately served the State’s interest. *Id.*, at 571.¹¹

In reaching its conclusion, the majority explained that although the special nature of commercial speech may require less than strict review of its regulation, special concerns arise from “regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-

¹¹In other words, the regulation failed the fourth step in the four-part inquiry that the majority announced in its opinion. It wrote:

“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” *Central Hudson*, 447 U. S., at 566.

related policy.” *Id.*, at 566, n. 9. In those circumstances, “a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying governmental policy.” *Ibid.* As a result, the Court concluded that “special care” should attend the review of such blanket bans, and it pointedly remarked that “in recent years this Court has not approved a blanket ban on commercial speech unless the speech itself was flawed in some way, either because it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.” *Ibid.*¹²

III

As our review of the case law reveals, Rhode Island errs in concluding that *all* commercial speech regulations are subject to a similar form of constitutional review simply because they target a similar category of expression. The mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to suppress them. See *Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.*, 514 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 1–3) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands.

Sound reasons justify reviewing the latter type of commercial speech regulation more carefully. Most obviously, complete speech bans, unlike content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, or

¹²The Justices concurring in the judgment adopted a somewhat broader view. They expressed “doubt whether suppression of information concerning the availability and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to ‘dampen’ the demand for or use of the product.” *Id.*, at 574. Indeed, Justice Blackmun believed that even “though ‘commercial’ speech is involved, such a regulation strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.” *Ibid.*

manner of expression, see *Kovacs v. Cooper*, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949), are particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain information.

Our commercial speech cases have recognized the dangers that attend governmental attempts to single out certain messages for suppression. For example, in *Linmark*, 431 U.S., at 92–94, we concluded that a ban on “For Sale” signs was “content based” and failed to leave open “satisfactory” alternative channels of communication; see also *Virginia Pharmacy Bd.*, 425 U.S., at 771. Moreover, last Term we upheld a 30-day prohibition against a certain form of legal solicitation largely because it left so many channels of communication open to Florida lawyers. *Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.*, 515 U.S. ___, ___–___ (1995) (slip op., at 15–16).¹³

The special dangers that attend complete bans on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech cannot be explained away by appeals to the “commonsense distinctions” that exist between commercial and noncommercial speech. *Virginia Pharmacy Bd.*, 425 U.S., at 771, n. 24. Regulations that suppress the truth are no less troubling because they target objectively verifiable information, nor are they less effective because they aim at durable messages. As a result, neither the “greater objectivity” nor the “greater hardiness” of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech justifies reviewing its complete suppression with added deference. *Ibid.*

¹³“Florida permits lawyers to advertise on prime-time television and radio as well as in newspapers and other media. They may rent space on billboards. They may send untargeted letters to the general population, or to discrete segments thereof. There are, of course, pages upon pages devoted to lawyers in the Yellow Pages of Florida telephone directories. These listings are organized alphabetically and by area of specialty. See generally Rule 4–7.2(a), Rules Regulating The Florida Bar ([A] lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, billboards, and other signs, radio, television, and recorded messages the public may access by dialing a telephone number, or through written communication not involving solicitation as defined in rule 4–7.4’); *The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar—Advertising Issues*, 571 So 2d, at 461.” *Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.*, 515 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 15–16).

It is the State's interest in protecting consumers from “commercial harms” that provides “the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.” *Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.*, 507 U. S. 410, 426 (1993). Yet bans that target truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages rarely protect consumers from such harms.¹⁴ Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an “underlying governmental policy” that could be implemented without regulating speech. *Central Hudson*, 447 U. S., at 566, n. 9. In this way, these commercial speech bans not only hinder consumer choice, but also impede debate over central issues of public policy. See *id.*, at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).¹⁵

Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond “irrationally” to the truth. *Linmark*, 431 U. S., at 96. The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good. That teaching applies equally to state attempts to deprive consumers of accurate information about their chosen products:

“The commercial market-place, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital,

¹⁴In *Discovery Network*, we held that the city's categorical ban on commercial newsracks attached too much importance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. After concluding that the aesthetic and safety interests served by the newsrack ban bore no relationship whatsoever to the prevention of commercial harms, we rejected the State's attempt to justify its ban on the sole ground that it targeted commercial speech. See 507 U. S., at 428.

¹⁵This case bears out the point. Rhode Island seeks to reduce alcohol consumption by increasing alcohol price; yet its means of achieving that goal deprives the public of their chief source of information about the reigning price level of alcohol. As a result, the State's price advertising ban keeps the public ignorant of the key barometer of the ban's effectiveness: The alcohol beverages' prices.

some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented. Thus, even a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment. See *Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, supra*, at 762.” *Edenfield v. Fane*, 507 U. S. 761, 767 (1993).

See also *Linmark*, 431 U. S. at 96 (1977); *Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.*, 514 U. S., at ___ (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Tribe, *American Constitutional Law* §12–2, at 790, and n. 11.

IV

In this case, there is no question that Rhode Island's price advertising ban constitutes a blanket prohibition against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful product. There is also no question that the ban serves an end unrelated to consumer protection. Accordingly, we must review the price advertising ban with “special care,” *Central Hudson*, 447 U. S., at 566, n. 9, mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive constitutional review. *Ibid.*

The State argues that the price advertising prohibition should nevertheless be upheld because it directly advances the State's substantial interest in promoting temperance, and because it is no more extensive than necessary. Cf. *Central Hudson*, 447 U. S., at 566. Although there is some confusion as to what Rhode Island means by temperance, we assume that the State asserts an interest in reducing alcohol consumption.¹⁶

¹⁶Before the District Court, the State argued that it sought to reduce consumption among irresponsible drinkers. App. 67. In its brief to this Court, it equates its interest in promoting temperance with an interest in reducing alcohol consumption among all drinkers. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents 28. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has characterized the State's interest in “promoting temperance” as both “the state's interest in reducing the consumption of liquor,” *S&S Liquormart, Inc. v. Pastore*, 497 A. 2d 729, 734 (1985), and the State's interest in discouraging “excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages.” *Id.* at 735. A state statute declares the ban's purpose to be “the promotion of temperance and for the reasonable control of the traffic in alcoholic beverages.” R. I. Gen. Laws § 3–1–5 (1987).

In evaluating the ban's effectiveness in advancing the State's interest, we note that a commercial speech regulation “may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose.” *Central Hudson*, 447 U. S., at 564. For that reason, the State bears the burden of showing not merely that its regulation will advance its interest, but also that it will do so “to a material degree.” *Edenfield*, 507 U. S., at 771; see also *Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.*, 514 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8–9). The need for the State to make such a showing is particularly great given the drastic nature of its chosen means—the wholesale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading information. Accordingly, we must determine whether the State has shown that the price advertising ban will *significantly* reduce alcohol consumption.

We can agree that common sense supports the conclusion that a prohibition against price advertising, like a collusive agreement among competitors to refrain from such advertising,¹⁷ will tend to mitigate competition and maintain prices at a higher level than would prevail in a completely free market. Despite the absence of proof on the point, we can even agree with the State's contention that it is reasonable to assume that demand, and hence consumption throughout the market, is somewhat lower whenever a higher, noncompetitive price level prevails. However, without any findings of fact, or indeed any evidentiary support whatsoever, we cannot agree with the assertion that the price advertising ban will significantly advance the State's interest in promoting temperance.

Although the record suggests that the price advertising ban may have some impact on the purchasing patterns of temperate drinkers of modest means, 829 F. Supp., at 546, the State has presented no evidence to suggest that its speech prohibition will *significantly* reduce market-wide

¹⁷See, e.g., *Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.*, 485 U. S. 717, 735 (1988) (considering restriction on price advertising as evidence of Sherman Act violation); *United States v. Sealy, Inc.*, 388 U. S. 350, 355 (1967) (same); *Blackburn v. Sweeney*, 53 F. 3d 825, 828 (CA7 1995) (considering restrictions on the location of advertising as evidence of Sherman Act violation).

consumption.¹⁸ Indeed, the District Court's considered and uncontradicted finding on this point is directly to the contrary. *Id.*, at 549.¹⁹ Moreover, the evidence suggests that the abusive drinker will probably not be deterred by a marginal price increase, and that the true alcoholic may simply reduce his purchases of other necessities.

In addition, as the District Court noted, the State has not identified what price level would lead to a significant reduction in alcohol consumption, nor has it identified the amount that it believes prices would decrease without the ban. *Ibid.* Thus, the State's own showing reveals that any connection between the ban and a significant change in alcohol consumption would be purely fortuitous.

As is evident, any conclusion that elimination of the ban would significantly increase alcohol consumption would require us to engage in the sort of "speculation or conjecture" that is an unacceptable means of demonstrating that a

¹⁸The appellants' stipulation that they each expect to realize a \$100,000 benefit per year if the ban is lifted is not to the contrary. App. 47. The stipulation shows only that the appellants believe they will be able to compete more effectively for existing alcohol consumers if there is no ban on price advertising. It does not show that they believe either the number of alcohol consumers, or the number of purchases by those consumers, will increase in the ban's absence. Indeed, the State's own expert conceded that "plaintiffs' expectation of realizing additional profits through price advertising has no necessary relationship to increased overall consumption." 829 F. Supp., at 549.

Moreover, we attach little significance to the fact that some studies suggest that people budget the amount of money that they will spend on alcohol. 39 F. 3d 5, 7 (CA1 1994). These studies show only that, in a competitive market, people will tend to search for the cheapest product in order to meet their budgets. The studies do not suggest that the amount of money budgeted for alcohol consumption will remain fixed in the face of a market-wide price increase.

¹⁹Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the regulation directly advanced the State's interest, it did not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the evidence suggested that, at most, a price advertising ban would have a marginal impact on overall alcohol consumption. *Id.*, at 7–8; cf. *Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Assn. v. Attorney General*, 142 Mich. App., at 311, 370 N. W. 2d, at 336 (explaining that "any additional impact on the level of consumption attributable to the absence of price advertisements would be negligible").

restriction on commercial speech directly advances the State's asserted interest. *Edenfield*, 507 U. S., at 770.²⁰ Such speculation certainly does not suffice when the State takes aim at accurate commercial information for paternalistic ends.

The State also cannot satisfy the requirement that its restriction on speech be no more extensive than necessary. It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal of promoting temperance. As the State's own expert conceded, higher prices can be maintained either by direct regulation or by increased taxation. 829 F. Supp., at 549. Per capita purchases could be limited as is the case with prescription drugs. Even educational campaigns focused on the problems of excessive, or even moderate, drinking might prove to be more effective.

As a result, even under the less than strict standard that generally applies in commercial speech cases, the State has failed to establish a "reasonable fit" between its abridgment of speech and its temperance goal. *Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox*, 492 U. S. 469, 480 (1989); see also *Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.*, 514 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15) (explaining that defects in a federal ban on alcohol advertising are "further highlighted by the availability of alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment's protections for commercial speech"); *Linmark*, 431 U. S., at 97 (suggesting that the State use financial incentives or counter-speech, rather than speech restrictions, to advance its interests). It necessarily follows that the price advertising ban cannot survive the more stringent constitutional review that *Central Hudson* itself concluded was appropriate for the complete suppression of truthful, nonmisleading

²⁰Outside the First Amendment context, we have refused to uphold alcohol advertising bans premised on similarly speculative assertions about their impact on consumption. See *Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp*, 467 U. S. 691, 715–716 (1984) (holding ban pre-empted by Federal Communications Commission regulations); *California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.*, 445 U. S. 97 (1980) (holding ban violated the Sherman Act). It would be anomalous if the First Amendment were more tolerant of speech bans than federal regulations and statutes.

commercial speech. *Central Hudson*, 447 U. S., at 566, n. 9.

V

The State responds by arguing that it merely exercised appropriate “legislative judgment” in determining that a price advertising ban would best promote temperance. Relying on the *Central Hudson* analysis set forth in *Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P. R.*, 478 U. S. 328 (1986), and *United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.*, 509 U. S. ___ (1993), Rhode Island first argues that, because expert opinions as to the effectiveness of the price advertising ban “go both ways,” the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the ban constituted a “reasonable choice” by the legislature. 39 F. 3d, at 7. The State next contends that precedent requires us to give particular deference to that legislative choice because the State could, if it chose, ban the sale of alcoholic beverages outright. See *Posadas*, 478 U. S., at 345–346. Finally, the State argues that deference is appropriate because alcoholic beverages are so-called “vice” products. See *Edge*, 509 U. S. ___ (slip op., at ___); *Posadas*, 478 U. S., at 346–347. We consider each of these contentions in turn.

The State's first argument fails to justify the speech prohibition at issue. Our commercial speech cases recognize some room for the exercise of legislative judgment. See *Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego*, 453 U. S. 490, 507–508 (1981). However, Rhode Island errs in concluding that *Edge* and *Posadas* establish the degree of deference that its decision to impose a price advertising ban warrants.

In *Edge*, we upheld a federal statute that permitted only those broadcasters located in States that had legalized lotteries to air lottery advertising. The statute was designed to regulate advertising about an activity that had been deemed illegal in the jurisdiction in which the broadcaster was located. 509 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14–15). Here, by contrast, the commercial speech ban targets information about entirely lawful behavior.

Posadas is more directly relevant. There, a five-Member majority held that, under the *Central Hudson* test, it was “up to the legislature” to choose to reduce gambling by suppressing in-state casino

advertising rather than engaging in educational speech. *Posadas*, 478 U. S., at 344. Rhode Island argues that this logic demonstrates the constitutionality of its own decision to ban price advertising in lieu of raising taxes or employing some other less speech-restrictive means of promoting temperance.

The reasoning in *Posadas* does support the State's argument, but, on reflection, we are now persuaded that *Posadas* erroneously performed the First Amendment analysis. The casino advertising ban was designed to keep truthful, nonmisleading speech from members of the public for fear that they would be more likely to gamble if they received it. As a result, the advertising ban served to shield the State's antigambling policy from the public scrutiny that more direct, nonspeech regulation would draw. See *Posadas*, 478 U. S., at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Given our longstanding hostility to commercial speech regulation of this type, *Posadas* clearly erred in concluding that it was “up to the legislature” to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy. The *Posadas* majority's conclusion on that point cannot be reconciled with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down similarly broad regulations on truthful, nonmisleading advertising when non-speech-related alternatives were available. See *Posadas*, 478 U. S., at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing cases); *Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company*: “’Twas Strange, ’Twas Passing Strange; ’Twas Pitiful, ’Twas Wondrous Pitiful,” 1986 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 12–15.

Because the 5-to-4 decision in *Posadas* marked such a sharp break from our prior precedent, and because it concerned a constitutional question about which this Court is the final arbiter, we decline to give force to its highly deferential approach. Instead, in keeping with our prior holdings, we conclude that a state legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes that the *Posadas* majority was willing to tolerate. As we explained in *Virginia Pharmacy Bd.*, “[i]t is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that

the First Amendment makes for us.” 425 U. S., at 770.

We also cannot accept the State's second contention, which is premised entirely on the “greater-includes-the-lesser” reasoning endorsed toward the end of the majority's opinion in *Posadas*. There, the majority stated that “the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.” 478 U. S., at 345–346. It went on to state that “*because* the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of [casino gambling] it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising.” *Id.*, at 346. The majority concluded that it would “surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased demand.” *Ibid.* On the basis of these statements, the State reasons that its undisputed authority to ban alcoholic beverages must include the power to restrict advertisements offering them for sale.

In *Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.*, 514 U. S. ___ (1995), the United States advanced a similar argument as a basis for supporting a statutory prohibition against revealing the alcoholic content of malt beverages on product labels. We rejected the argument, noting that the statement in the *Posadas* opinion was made only after the majority had concluded that the Puerto Rican regulation “survived the *Central Hudson* test.” 514 U. S., at ___, n. 2 (slip op., at 5, n. 2). Further consideration persuades us that the “greater-includes-the-lesser” argument should be rejected for the additional and more important reason that it is inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doctrine.

Although we do not dispute the proposition that greater powers include lesser ones, we fail to see how that syllogism requires the conclusion that the State's power to regulate commercial *activity* is “greater” than its power to ban truthful, nonmisleading commercial *speech*. Contrary to the

assumption made in *Posadas*, we think it quite clear that banning speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct. As a venerable proverb teaches, it may prove more injurious to prevent people from teaching others how to fish than to prevent fish from being sold.²¹ Similarly, a local ordinance banning bicycle lessons may curtail freedom far more than one that prohibits bicycle riding within city limits. In short, we reject the assumption that words are necessarily less vital to freedom than actions, or that logic somehow proves that the power to prohibit an activity is necessarily “greater” than the power to suppress speech about it.

As a matter of First Amendment doctrine, the *Posadas* syllogism is even less defensible. The text of the First Amendment makes clear that the Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct. That presumption accords with the essential role that the free flow of information plays in a democratic society. As a result, the First Amendment directs that government may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress conduct, and that speech restrictions cannot be treated as simply another means that the government may use to achieve its ends.

These basic First Amendment principles clearly apply to commercial speech; indeed, the *Posadas* majority impliedly conceded as much by applying the *Central Hudson* test. Thus, it is no answer that commercial speech concerns products and services that the government may freely regulate. Our decisions from *Virginia Pharmacy Bd.* on have made plain that a State's regulation of the sale of goods differs in kind from a State's regulation of accurate information about those goods. The distinction that our cases have consistently drawn between these two types of governmental action is fundamentally incompatible with the absolutist view that the State may ban commercial speech

²¹“Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime.” The International Thesaurus of Quotations 646 (compiled by R. Tripp 1970).

simply because it may constitutionally prohibit the underlying conduct.²²

That the State has chosen to license its liquor retailers does not change the analysis. Even though government is under no obligation to provide a person, or the public, a particular benefit, it does not follow that conferral of the benefit may be conditioned on the surrender of a constitutional right. See, e.g., *Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal.*, 271 U. S. 583, 594 (1926). In *Perry v. Sindermann*, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), relying on a host of cases applying that principle during the preceding quarter-century, the Court explained that government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially his interest in freedom of speech.” *Id.*, at 597. That teaching clearly applies to state attempts to regulate commercial speech, as our cases striking down bans on truthful, nonmisleading speech by licensed professionals attest. See, e.g., *Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.*, 433 U. S., at 355; *Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U. S. 748 (1976).

Thus, just as it is perfectly clear that Rhode Island could not ban all obscene liquor ads except those that advocated temperance, we think it equally clear that its power to ban the sale of liquor entirely does not include a power to censor all advertisements that contain accurate and nonmisleading information about the price of the product. As the entire Court apparently now agrees, the statements in the *Posadas* opinion on which Rhode Island relies are no longer persuasive.

²²It is also no answer to say that it would be “strange” if the First Amendment tolerated a seemingly “greater” regulatory measure while forbidding a “lesser” one. We recently held that although the government had the power to proscribe an entire category of speech, such as obscenity or so-called fighting words, it could not limit the scope of its ban to obscene or fighting words that expressed a point of view with which the government disagrees. *R. A. V. v. St. Paul*, 505 U. S. 377 (1992). Similarly, in *Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.*, 507 U. S. 410 (1993), we assumed that States could prevent all newsracks from being placed on public sidewalks, but nevertheless concluded that they could not ban only those newsracks that contained certain commercial publications. *Id.*, at 428.

Finally, we find unpersuasive the State's contention that, under *Posadas* and *Edge*, the price advertising ban should be upheld because it targets commercial speech that pertains to a “vice” activity. The appellees premise their request for a so-called “vice” exception to our commercial speech doctrine on language in *Edge* which characterized gambling as a “vice”. *Edge*, 507 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at ___); see also *Posadas*, 478 U. S., at 346–347. The respondents misread our precedent. Our decision last Term striking down an alcohol-related advertising restriction effectively rejected the very contention respondents now make. See *Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.*, 514 U. S., at ___, ___, n. 2.

Moreover, the scope of any “vice” exception to the protection afforded by the First Amendment would be difficult, if not impossible, to define. Almost any product that poses some threat to public health or public morals might reasonably be characterized by a state legislature as relating to “vice activity”. Such characterization, however, is anomalous when applied to products such as alcoholic beverages, lottery tickets, or playing cards, that may be lawfully purchased on the open market. The recognition of such an exception would also have the unfortunate consequence of either allowing state legislatures to justify censorship by the simple expedient of placing the “vice” label on selected lawful activities, or requiring the federal courts to establish a federal common law of vice. See Kurland, 1986 S. Ct. Rev., at 15. For these reasons, a “vice” label that is unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibition against the commercial behavior at issue fails to provide a principled justification for the regulation of commercial speech about that activity.

VI

From 1919 until 1933, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution totally prohibited “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors” in the United States and its territories. Section 1 of the Twenty-first Amendment repealed that prohibition, and §2 delegated to the several States the power to prohibit commerce in, or the use of, alcoholic

beverages.²³ The States' regulatory power over this segment of commerce is therefore largely “unfettered by the Commerce Clause.” *Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves*, 308 U. S. 132, 138 (1939).

As is clear, the text of the Twenty-first Amendment supports the view that, while it grants the States authority over commerce that might otherwise be reserved to the Federal Government, it places no limit whatsoever on other constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, Rhode Island argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that in this case the Twenty-first Amendment tilts the First Amendment analysis in the State's favor. See 39 F. 3d, at 7–8.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on our decision in *California v. LaRue*, 409 U. S. 109 (1972).²⁴ In *LaRue*, five Members of the Court relied on the Twenty-first Amendment to buttress the conclusion that the First Amendment did not invalidate California's prohibition of certain grossly sexual exhibitions in premises licensed to serve alcoholic beverages. Specifically, the opinion stated that the Twenty-first Amendment required that the prohibition be given an added presumption in favor of its validity. See *id.*, at 118–119. We are now persuaded that the Court's analysis in *LaRue* would have led to precisely the same result if it had placed no reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment.

Entirely apart from the Twenty-first Amendment, the State has ample power to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages in inappropriate locations. Moreover, in subsequent cases the Court has recognized that the States' inherent police powers provide ample authority to restrict the kind of “bacchanalian revelries” described in the *LaRue* opinion regardless of whether alcoholic beverages are involved. *Id.*, at 118; see, e.g., *Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.*, 427 U. S. 50 (1976); *Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.*, 501 U. S. 560 (1991).

²³“Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 21, §2.

²⁴The State also relies on two *per curiam* opinions that followed the 21st Amendment analysis set forth in *Larue*. See *New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca*, 452 U. S. 714 (1981), and *Newport v. Iacobucci*, 479 U. S. 92 (1986).

As we recently noted: “*LaRue* did not involve commercial speech about alcohol, but instead concerned the regulation of nude dancing in places where alcohol was served.” *Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.*, 514 U. S., at ___, n. 2 (slip op., at 4, n. 2).

Without questioning the holding in *LaRue*, we now disavow its reasoning insofar as it relied on the Twenty-first Amendment. As we explained in a case decided more than a decade after *LaRue*, although the Twenty-first Amendment limits the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on a State's regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating beverages within its borders, “the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution.” *Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp*, 467 U. S. 691, 712 (1984). That general conclusion reflects our specific holdings that the Twenty-first Amendment does not in any way diminish the force of the Supremacy Clause, *id.*, at 712; *California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.*, 445 U.S. 97, 112–114 (1980), the Establishment Clause, *Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.*, 459 U. S. 116, 122, n. 5 (1982), or the Equal Protection Clause, *Craig v. Boren*, 429 U. S. 190, 209 (1976). We see no reason why the First Amendment should not also be included in that list. Accordingly, we now hold that the Twenty-first Amendment does not qualify the constitutional prohibition against laws abridging the freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment. The Twenty-first Amendment, therefore, cannot save Rhode Island's ban on liquor price advertising.

VII

Because Rhode Island has failed to carry its heavy burden of justifying its complete ban on price advertising, we conclude that R. I. Gen. Laws §§3–8–7 and 3–8–8.1, as well as Regulation 32 of the Rhode Island Liquor Control Administration, abridge speech in violation of the First Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.

It is so ordered.

GREATER NEW ORLEANS BROADCASTING

GREATER NEW ORLEANS BROADCASTING ASSOCIATION, INC., etc., et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES, et al.
No. 98-387.

Argued April 27, 1999.

Decided June 14, 1999.

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal law prohibits some, but by no means all, broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino gambling. In *United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.*, 509 U.S. 418, 113 S.Ct. 2696, 125 L.Ed.2d 345 (1993), we upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1304 as applied to broadcast advertising of Virginia's lottery by a radio station located in North Carolina, where no such lottery was authorized. Today we hold that § 1304 may not be applied to advertisements of private casino gambling that are broadcast by radio or television stations located in Louisiana, where such gambling is legal.

I

Through most of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, Congress adhered to a policy that not only discouraged the operation of lotteries and similar schemes, but forbade the dissemination of information concerning such enterprises by use of the mails, even when the lottery in question was chartered by a state legislature. [FN1] Consistent with this Court's earlier view that commercial advertising was unprotected by the First Amendment, see **Valentine v. Chrestensen*, 316 U.S. 52, 54, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942), we found that the notion that "lotteries ... are supposed to have a demoralizing influence upon the people" provided sufficient justification for excluding circulars concerning such enterprises from the federal postal system, *Ex parte Jackson*, 96 U.S. 727, 736-737, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1878). We likewise deferred to congressional judgment in upholding the similar exclusion for newspapers that contained either lottery advertisements or prize lists. In *re Rapier*, 143 U.S. 110, 134-135, 12 S.Ct. 374, 36 L.Ed. 93 (1892); see generally *Edge*, 509 U.S., at 421-422, 113 S.Ct. 2696; *Champion v. Ames*, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492 (1903). The current versions of these early antilottery statutes are now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303.

FN1. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 963 (prohibiting the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, and the mailing of, tickets and advertisements for lotteries and similar enterprises); Act of Mar. 2, 1827, § 6, 4 Stat. 238 (restricting the participation of postmasters and assistant postmasters in the lottery business); Act of July 27, 1868, § 13, 15 Stat. 196 (prohibiting the mailing of any letters or circulars concerning lotteries or similar enterprises); Act of July 12, 1876, § 2, 19 Stat. 90 (repealing an 1872 limitation of the mails prohibition to letters and circulars

concerning "illegal" lotteries); Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, § 1, 26 Stat. 465 (extending the mails prohibition to newspapers containing advertisements or prize lists for lotteries or gift enterprises).

Congress extended its restrictions on lottery-related information to broadcasting as communications technology made that practice both possible and profitable. It enacted the statute at issue in this case as § 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088. Now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1304 ("Broadcasting lottery information"), the statute prohibits radio and television broadcasting, by any station for which a license is required, of

"any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes."

The statute provides that each day's prohibited broadcasting constitutes a separate offense punishable by a fine, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. *Ibid.* Although § 1304 is a criminal statute, the Solicitor General informs us that, in practice, the provision traditionally has been enforced by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which imposes administrative sanctions on radio and television licensees for violations of the agency's implementing regulation. See 47 CFR § 73.1211 (1998); Brief for Respondents 3. Petitioners now concede that the broadcast ban in § 1304 and the FCC's regulation encompasses advertising for privately owned casinos--a concession supported by the broad language of the statute, our precedent, and the FCC's sound interpretation. See *FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.*, 347 U.S. 284, 290-291, and n. 8, 74 S.Ct. 593, 98 L.Ed. 699 (1954).

During the second half of this century, Congress dramatically narrowed the scope of the broadcast prohibition in § 1304. The first inroad was minor: In 1950, certain not-for-profit fishing contests were exempted as "innocent pastimes ... far removed from the reprehensible type of gambling activity which it was paramount in the congressional mind to forbid." S.Rep. No. 2243, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1950); see Act of Aug. 16, 1950, ch. 722, 64 Stat. 451, 18 U.S.C. § 1305.

Subsequent exemptions were more substantial. Responding to the growing popularity of state-run lotteries, in 1975 Congress enacted the provision that gave rise to our decision in *Edge*, 509 U.S., at 422-423, 113 S.Ct. 2696; Act of Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1916, 18 U.S.C. § 1307; see also § 1953(b)(4). With subsequent modifications, that amendment now exempts advertisements of state-conducted lotteries from the nationwide postal restrictions in §§ 1301 and 1302, and from the broadcast restriction in § 1304, when "broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in ... a State which conducts such a lottery." § 1307(a)(1)(B); see also §§ 1307(a)(1)(A), (b)(1). The § 1304 broadcast restriction remained in place, however, for stations licensed in States that do not conduct lotteries. In *Edge*, we held that this remaining restriction on broadcasts from nonlottery States, such as North Carolina, supported the "laws against gambling" in those jurisdictions and properly advanced the "congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States." 509 U.S., at 428, 113 S.Ct. 2696.

In 1988, Congress enacted two additional statutes that significantly curtailed the coverage of § 1304. First, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 102 Stat. 2467, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., authorized Native American tribes to conduct various forms of gambling--including casino gambling--pursuant* to tribal-state compacts if the State permits such gambling "for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity." § 2710(d)(1)(B). The IGRA also exempted "any gaming conducted by an Indian tribe pursuant to" the Act from both the postal and transportation restrictions in 18 U.S.C. § § 1301-1302, and the broadcast restriction in § 1304. 25 U.S.C. § 2720. Second, the Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2), extended the exemption from § § 1301-1304 for state-run lotteries to include any other lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme--not prohibited by the law of the State in which it operates--when conducted by: (i) any governmental organization; (ii) any not-for-profit organization; or (iii) a commercial organization as a promotional activity "clearly occasional and ancillary to the primary business of that organization." There is no dispute that the exemption in § 1307(a)(2) applies to casinos conducted by state and local governments. And, unlike the 1975 broadcast exemption for advertisements of and information concerning state-conducted lotteries, the exemptions in both of these 1988 statutes are not geographically limited; they shield messages from § 1304's reach in States that do not authorize such gambling as well as those that do.

A separate statute, the 1992 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq., proscribes most sports betting and advertising thereof. Section 3702 makes it unlawful for a State or tribe "to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact"--or for a person "to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact" of a State or tribe--any lottery or gambling scheme based directly or indirectly on competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate. However, the Act also includes a variety of exemptions, some with obscured congressional purposes: (i) gambling schemes conducted by States or other governmental entities at any time between January 1, 1976, and August 31, 1990; (ii) gambling schemes authorized by statutes in effect on October 2, 1991; (iii) gambling "conducted exclusively in casinos" located in certain municipalities if the schemes were authorized within 1 year of the effective date of the Act and, for "commercial casino gaming scheme[s]," that had been in operation for the preceding 10 years pursuant to a state constitutional provision and comprehensive state regulation applicable to that municipality; and (iv) gambling on parimutuel animal racing or jai-alai games. § 3704(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § § 1953(b)(1)(3) (regarding interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia). These exemptions make the scope of § 3702's advertising prohibition somewhat unclear, but the prohibition is not limited to broadcast media and does not depend on the location of a broadcast station or other disseminator of promotional materials.

Thus, unlike the uniform federal antigambling policy that prevailed in 1934 when 18 U.S.C. § 1304 was enacted, federal statutes now accommodate both progambling and antigambling segments of the national polity.

Petitioners are an association of Louisiana broadcasters and its members who operate FCC-licensed radio and television stations in the New Orleans metropolitan area. But for the threat of sanctions pursuant to § 1304 and the FCC's companion regulation, petitioners would broadcast promotional advertisements for gaming available at private, for-profit casinos that are lawful and regulated in both Louisiana and neighboring Mississippi. [FN2] According to an FCC official, however, "[u]nder appropriate conditions, some broadcast signals from Louisiana broadcasting stations may be heard in neighboring states including Texas and Arkansas," 3 Record 628, where private casino gambling is unlawful.

FN2. See, e.g., La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § § 27:2, 27:15B(1), 27:4227:43, 27:44(4), 27:44(10)-27:44(12) (West 1999); Miss.Code Ann. § § 75-76-3, 97-33-25 (1972); see also La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § § 27:202B-27:202D, 27:205(4), 27:205(12)-27:205(14), 27:210B (West 1999).

Petitioners brought this action against the United States and the FCC in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, praying for a declaration that § 1304 and the FCC's regulation violate the First Amendment as applied to them, and for an injunction preventing enforcement of the statute and the rule against them. After noting that all parties agreed that the case should be decided on their cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled in favor of the Government. 866 F.Supp. 975, 976 (1994). The court applied the standard for assessing commercial speech restrictions set out in *Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.*, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), and concluded that the restrictions at issue adequately advanced the Government's "substantial interest (1) in protecting the interest of nonlottery states and (2) in reducing participation in gambling and thereby minimizing the social costs associated therewith." 866 F.Supp., at 979. The court pointed out that federal law does not prohibit the broadcast of all information about casinos, such as advertising that promotes a casino's amenities rather than its "gaming aspects," and observed that advertising for state-authorized casinos in Louisiana and Mississippi was actually "abundant." *Id.*, at 980.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the District Court's application of *Central Hudson*, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the Government. 69 F.3d 1296, 1298 (1995). The panel majority's description of the asserted governmental interests, although more specific, was essentially the same as the District Court's:

"First, section 1304 serves the interest of assisting states that restrict gambling by regulating interstate activities such as broadcasting that are beyond the powers of the individual states to regulate. The second asserted governmental interest lies in discouraging public participation in commercial gambling, thereby minimizing the wide variety of social ills that have historically been associated with such activities." *Id.*, at 1299.

The majority relied heavily on our decision in *Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P. R.*, 478 U.S. 328, 106 S.Ct. 2968, 92 L.Ed.2d 266 (1986), see 69 F.3d, at 1300-1302, and endorsed the theory that, because gambling

is in a category of "vice activity" that can be banned altogether, "advertising of gambling can lay no greater claim on constitutional protection than the underlying activity," *id.*, at 1302. In dissent, Chief Judge Politz contended that the many exceptions to the original prohibition in § 1304--and that section's conflict with the policies of States that had legalized gambling--precluded justification of the restriction by either an interest in supporting anticasinio state policies or "an independent federal interest in discouraging public participation in commercial gambling." *Id.*, at 1303-1304.

While the broadcasters' petition for certiorari was pending in this Court, we decided *44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island*, 517 U.S. 484, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996). Because the opinions in that case concluded that our precedent both preceding and following *Posadas* had applied the Central Hudson test more strictly, 517 U.S., at 509-510, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); *id.*, at 531-532, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment)--and because we had rejected the argument that the power to restrict speech about certain socially harmful activities was as broad as the power to prohibit such conduct, see *id.*, at 513-514, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); see also *Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.*, 514 U.S. 476, 482-483, n. 2, 115 S.Ct. 1585, 131 L.Ed.2d 532 (1995)--we granted the broadcasters' petition, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration. 519 U.S. 801, 117 S.Ct. 39, 136 L.Ed.2d 3 (1996).

On remand, the Fifth Circuit majority adhered to its prior conclusion. 149 F.3d 334 (1998). The majority recognized that at least part of the Central Hudson inquiry had "become a tougher standard for the state to satisfy," 149 F.3d, at 338, but held that § 1304's restriction on speech sufficiently advanced the asserted governmental interests and was not "broader than necessary to control participation in casino gambling," *id.*, at 340. Because the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in *Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States*, 107 F.3d 1328, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1115, 118 S.Ct. 1050, 140 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998), as did a Federal District Court in *Players, International, Inc. v. United States*, 988 F.Supp. 497 (N.J.1997), we again granted the broadcasters' petition for certiorari. 525 U.S. 1097, 119 S.Ct. 863, 142 L.Ed.2d 716 (1999). We now reverse.

III

In a number of cases involving restrictions on speech that is "commercial" in nature, we have employed Central Hudson's four-part test to resolve First Amendment challenges:

"At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." 447 U.S., at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343.

In this analysis, the Government bears the burden of identifying a substantial interest and justifying the challenged restriction. *Edenfield v. Fane*, 507 U.S. 761, 770, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993); *Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox*, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989); *Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.*, 463 U.S. 60, 71, and n. 20, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983).

The four parts of the Central Hudson test are not entirely discrete. All are important and, to a certain extent, interrelated: Each raises a relevant question that may not be dispositive to the First Amendment inquiry, but the answer to which may inform a judgment concerning the other three. Partly because of these intricacies, petitioners as well as certain judges, scholars, and amici curiae have advocated repudiation of the Central Hudson standard and implementation of a more straightforward and stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions on commercial speech. [FN3] As the opinions in *44 Liquormart* demonstrate, reasonable judges may disagree about the merits of such proposals. It is, however, an established part of our constitutional jurisprudence that we do not ordinarily reach out to make novel or unnecessarily broad pronouncements on constitutional issues when a case can be fully resolved on a narrower ground. See *United States v. Raines*, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960). In this case, there is no need to break new ground. Central Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision.

FN3. See, e.g., Pet. for Cert. 23; Brief for Petitioners 10; Reply Brief for Petitioners 18-20; *44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island*, 517 U.S. 484, 526-528, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (THOMAS, J., concurring); *Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?*, 76 Va. L.Rev. 627 (1990); Brief for Association of National Advertisers, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 3-4; Brief for American Advertising Federation as Amicus Curiae 2.

IV

All parties to this case agree that the messages petitioners wish to broadcast constitute commercial speech, and that these broadcasts would satisfy the first part of the Central Hudson test: Their content is not misleading and concerns lawful activities, i.e., private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. As well, the proposed commercial messages would convey information--whether taken favorably or unfavorably by the audience--about an activity that is the subject of intense public debate in many communities. In addition, petitioners' broadcasts presumably would disseminate accurate information as to the operation of market competitors, such as pay-out ratios, which can benefit listeners by informing their consumption choices and fostering price competition. Thus, even if the broadcasters' interest in conveying these messages is entirely pecuniary, the interests of, and benefit to, the audience may be broader. See *Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.*, 425 U.S. 748, 764-765, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976); *Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro*, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); *Bigelow v. Virginia*, 421 U.S. 809, 822, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975).

The second part of the Central Hudson test asks whether the asserted governmental interest served by the speech restriction is substantial. The Solicitor General identifies two such interests: (1) reducing the social costs associated with "gambling" or "casino gambling," and (2) assisting States that "restrict gambling" or "prohibit casino gambling" within their own borders. [FN4] Underlying Congress' statutory scheme, the Solicitor General contends, is the judgment that gambling contributes to corruption and organized crime; underwrites bribery, narcotics trafficking, and other illegal conduct; imposes a regressive tax on the poor; and "offers a false but sometimes irresistible hope of financial advancement." Brief for Respondents 15-16. With respect to casino gambling, the Solicitor General states that many of the associated social costs stem from "pathological" or "compulsive" gambling by approximately 3 million Americans, whose behavior is primarily associated with "continuous play" games, such as slot machines. He also observes that compulsive gambling has grown along with the expansion of legalized gambling nationwide, leading to billions of dollars in economic costs; injury and loss to these gamblers as well as their families, communities, and government; and street, white-collar, and organized crime. *Id.*, at 16-20.

FN4. Brief for Respondents 12, 15, 28. We will concentrate on the Government's contentions as to "casino gambling": They are the focus of the Government's argument and are more closely linked to the speech regulation at issue, thereby providing a more likely basis for upholding § 1304 as applied to these broadcasters and their proposed messages.

We can accept the characterization of these two interests as "substantial," but that conclusion is by no means self-evident. No one seriously doubts that the Federal Government may assert a legitimate and substantial interest in alleviating the societal ills recited above, or in assisting like-minded States to do the same. Cf. *Edge*, 509 U.S., at 428, 113 S.Ct. 2696. But in the judgment of both the Congress and many state legislatures, the social costs that support the suppression of gambling are offset, and sometimes outweighed, by countervailing policy considerations, primarily in the form of economic benefits. [FN5] Despite its awareness of the potential social costs, Congress has not only sanctioned casino gambling for Indian tribes through tribal-state compacts, but has enacted other statutes that reflect approval of state legislation that authorizes a host of public and private gambling activities. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § § 1307, 1953(b); 25 U.S.C. § § 2701-2702, 2710(d); 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a). That Congress has generally exempted state-run lotteries and casinos from federal gambling legislation reflects a decision to defer to, and even promote, differing gambling policies in different States. Indeed, in *Edge* we identified the federal interest furthered by § 1304's partial broadcast ban as the "congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States." 509 U.S., at 428, 113 S.Ct. 2696. Whatever its character in 1934 when § 1304 was adopted, the federal policy of discouraging gambling in general, and casino gambling in particular, is now decidedly equivocal.

FN5. Some form of gambling is legal in nearly every State. Government Lodging 192. Thirty-seven States and the District of Columbia operate lotteries. *Ibid.*; National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Staff Report: Lotteries 1 (1999). As of

1997, commercial casino gambling existed in 11 States, see North American Gaming Report 1997, Int'l Gaming & Wagering Bus., July 1997, pp. S4-S31, and at least 5 authorize statesponsored video gambling, see Del.Code Ann., Tit. 29, § § 4801, 4803(f)-(g), 4820 (1974 and Supp.1997); Ore.Rev.Stat. § 461.215 (1998); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-61.2-2(a) (1998); S.D. Const., Art. III, § 25 (1999); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § § 42-7A-4(4), (11A) (1991); W. Va.Code § 29-22A-4 (1999). Also as of 1997, about half the States in the Union hosted Class III Indian gaming (which may encompass casino gambling), including Louisiana, Mississippi, and four other States that had private casinos. United States General Accounting Office, Casino Gaming Regulation: Roles of Five States and the National Indian Gaming Commission 4-6 (May 1998) (including Indian casino gaming in five States without approved compacts); cf. National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Staff Report: Native American Gaming 2 (1999) (hereinafter Native American Gaming) (noting that 14 States have on-reservation Indian casinos, and that those casinos are the only casinos in 8 States). One count by the Bureau of Indian Affairs tallied 60 tribes that advertise their casinos on television and radio. Government Lodging 408, 435-437 (3 App. in Player's Int'l, Inc. v. United States, No. 98-5127 (C.A.3)). By the mid-1990's, tribal casino-style gambling generated over \$3 billion in gaming revenue--increasing its share to 18% of all casino gaming revenue, matching the total for the casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and reaching about half the figure for Nevada's casinos. See Native American Gaming 2; Government Lodging 407, 423-429.

Of course, it is not our function to weigh the policy arguments on either side of the nationwide debate over whether and to what extent casino and other forms of gambling should be legalized. Moreover, enacted congressional policy and "governmental interests" are not necessarily equivalents for purposes of commercial speech analysis. See Bolger, 463 U.S., at 70-71, 103 S.Ct. 2875. But we cannot ignore Congress' unwillingness to adopt a single national policy that consistently endorses either interest asserted by the Solicitor General. See Edenfield, 507 U.S., at 768, 113 S.Ct. 1792; 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S., at 531, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). Even though the Government has identified substantial interests, when we consider both their quality and the information sought to be suppressed, the crosscurrents in the scope and application of § 1304 become more difficult for the Government to defend.

V

The third part of the Central Hudson test asks whether the speech restriction directly and materially advances the asserted governmental interest. "This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree." Edenfield, 507 U.S., at 770-771 113 S.Ct. 1792. Consequently, "the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose." Central Hudson, 447 U.S., at 564, 100 S.Ct. 2343. We have observed that "this requirement is critical; otherwise, 'a State could with ease restrict commercial speech in the service of other objectives that could not

themselves justify a burden on commercial expression.' " Rubin, 514 U.S., at 487, 115 S.Ct. 1585, quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S., at 771, 113 S.Ct. 1792.

The fourth part of the test complements the direct-advancement inquiry of the third, asking whether the speech restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests that support it. The Government is not required to employ the least restrictive means conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest--"a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served." Fox, 492 U.S., at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S., at 529, 531, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). On the whole, then, the challenged regulation should indicate that its proponent " 'carefully calculated' the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition." *Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.*, 507 U.S. 410, 417, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993), quoting Fox, 492 U.S., at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028.

As applied to petitioners' case, § 1304 cannot satisfy these standards. With regard to the first asserted interest--alleviating the social costs of casino gambling by limiting demand--the Government contends that its broadcasting restrictions directly advance that interest because "promotional" broadcast advertising concerning casino gambling increases demand for such gambling, which in turn increases the amount of casino gambling that produces those social costs. Additionally, the Government believes that compulsive gamblers are especially susceptible to the pervasiveness and potency of broadcast advertising. Brief for Respondents 33-36. Assuming the accuracy of this causal chain, it does not necessarily follow that the Government's speech ban has directly and materially furthered the asserted interest. While it is no doubt fair to assume that more advertising would have some impact on overall demand for gambling, it is also reasonable to assume that much of that advertising would merely channel gamblers to one casino rather than another. More important, any measure of the effectiveness of the Government's attempt to minimize the social costs of gambling cannot ignore Congress' simultaneous encouragement of tribal casino gambling, which may well be growing at a rate exceeding any increase in gambling or compulsive gambling that private casino advertising could produce. See n. 5, *supra*. And, as the Court of Appeals recognized, the Government fails to "connect casino gambling and compulsive gambling with broadcast advertising for casinos"--let alone broadcast advertising for non-Indian commercial casinos. 149 F.3d, at 339. [FN6]

FN6. The Government cites several secondary sources and declarations that it put before the Federal District Court in New Jersey and, as an alternative to affirming the judgment below, requests a remand so that it may have another chance to build a record in the Fifth Circuit. Remand is inappropriate for several reasons. First, the Government had ample opportunity to enter the materials it thought relevant after we vacated the Fifth Circuit's first ruling and remanded for reconsideration in light of 44 Liquormart. Second, the Government's evidence did not convince the New Jersey court that § 1304 could be constitutionally applied in

circumstances similar to this case, see *Players Int'l, Inc. v. United States*, 988 F.Supp. 497, 502-503, 506-507 (1997), and most of the sources that the Government cited in the New Jersey litigation were also presented to the Fifth Circuit, see Supplemental Brief for Appellees in No. 9430732(CA5), pp. iv-v. Indeed, the Government presented sources to the Fifth Circuit not provided to the New Jersey court, and the Fifth Circuit relied on material that the Government had not proffered. In any event, as we shall explain, additional evidence to support the Government's factual assertions in this Court cannot justify the scheme of speech restrictions currently in effect.

We need not resolve the question whether any lack of evidence in the record fails to satisfy the standard of proof under *Central Hudson*, however, because the flaw in the Government's case is more fundamental: The operation of § 1304 and its attendant regulatory regime is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it. See *Rubin*, 514 U.S., at 488, 115 S.Ct. 1585. Under current law, a broadcaster may not carry advertising about privately operated commercial casino gambling, regardless of the location of the station or the casino. 18 U.S.C. § 1304; 47 CFR § 73.1211(a) (1998). On the other hand, advertisements for tribal casino gambling authorized by state compacts--whether operated by the tribe or by a private party pursuant to a management contract--are subject to no such broadcast ban, even if the broadcaster is located in, or broadcasts to, a jurisdiction with the strictest of antigambling policies. 25 U.S.C. § 2720. Government-operated, nonprofit, and "occasional and ancillary" commercial casinos are likewise exempt. 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2).

The FCC's interpretation and application of §§ 1304 and 1307 underscore the statute's infirmity. Attempting to enforce the underlying purposes and policy of the statute, the FCC has permitted broadcasters to tempt viewers with claims of "Vegas-style excitement" at a commercial "casino," if "casino" is part of the establishment's proper name and the advertisement can be taken to refer to the casino's amenities, rather than directly promote its gaming aspects. [FN7] While we can hardly fault the FCC in view of the statute's focus on the suppression of certain types of information, the agency's practice is squarely at odds with the governmental interests asserted in this case.

FN7. See, e.g., Letter to DR Partners, 8 FCC Rcd 44 (1992); *In re WTMJ, Inc.*, 8 FCC Rcd 4354 (1993) (disapproving of the phrase "Vegas style games"); see also 2 Record 493, 497-498 (Mass Media Bureau letter to Forbes W. Blair, Apr. 10, 1987) (concluding that a proposed television commercial stating that the "odds for fun are high" at the sponsor's establishment would be lawful); *id.*, at 492, 500-501.

From what we can gather, the Government is committed to prohibiting accurate product information, not commercial enticements of all kinds, and then only when conveyed over certain forms of media and for certain types of gambling--indeed, for only certain brands of casino gambling--and despite the fact that messages about the availability of such gambling are being conveyed over the airwaves by other speakers.

Even putting aside the broadcast exemptions for arguably distinguishable sorts of gambling that might also give rise to social costs about which the Federal Government is concerned--such as state lotteries and parimutuel betting on horse and dog races, § 1307(a)(1)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)--the Government presents no convincing reason for pegging its speech ban to the identity of the owners or operators of the advertised casinos. The Government cites revenue needs of States and tribes that conduct casino gambling, and notes that net revenues generated by the tribal casinos are dedicated to the welfare of the tribes and their members. See 25 U.S.C. § § 2710(b)(2)(B), (d)(1)(A)(ii), (2)(A). Yet the Government admits that tribal casinos offer precisely the same types of gambling as private casinos. Further, the Solicitor General does not maintain that government-operated casino gaming is any different, that States cannot derive revenue from taxing private casinos, or that any one class of casino operators is likely to advertise in a meaningfully distinct manner from the others. The Government's suggestion that Indian casinos are too isolated to warrant attention is belied by a quick review of tribal geography and the Government's own evidence regarding the financial success of tribal gaming. See n. 5, *supra*. If distance were determinative, Las Vegas might have remained a relatively small community, or simply disappeared like a desert mirage.

Ironically, the most significant difference identified by the Government between tribal and other classes of casino gambling is that the former is "heavily regulated." Brief for Respondents 38. If such direct regulation provides a basis for believing that the social costs of gambling in tribal casinos are sufficiently mitigated to make their advertising tolerable, one would have thought that Congress might have at least experimented with comparable regulation before abridging the speech rights of federally unregulated casinos. While Congress' failure to institute such direct regulation of private casino gambling does not necessarily compromise the constitutionality of § 1304, it does undermine the asserted justifications for the restriction before us. See *Rubin*, 514 U.S., at 490-491, 115 S.Ct. 1585. There surely are practical and nonspeech-related forms of regulation--including a prohibition or supervision of gambling on credit; limitations on the use of cash machines on casino premises; controls on admissions; pot or betting limits; location restrictions; and licensing requirements--that could more directly and effectively alleviate some of the social costs of casino gambling.

We reached a similar conclusion in *Rubin*. There, we considered the effect of conflicting federal policies on the Government's claim that a speech restriction materially advanced its interest in preventing so-called "strength wars" among competing sellers of certain alcoholic beverages. We concluded that the effect of the challenged restriction on commercial speech had to be evaluated in the context of the entire regulatory scheme, rather than in isolation, and we invalidated the restriction based on the "overall irrationality of the Government's regulatory scheme." *Id.*, at 488, 115 S.Ct. 1585. As in this case, there was "little chance" that the speech restriction could have directly and materially advanced its aim, "while other provisions of the same Act directly undermine[d] and counteract[ed] its effects." *Id.*, at 489, 115 S.Ct. 1585. Coupled with the availability of other regulatory options which could advance the asserted interests "in a manner less intrusive to

[petitioners'] First Amendment rights," we found that the Government could not satisfy the Central Hudson test. *Id.*, at 490491, 115 S.Ct. 1585.

Given the special federal interest in protecting the welfare of Native Americans, see *California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians*, 480 U.S. 202, 216-217, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987), we recognize that there may be valid reasons for imposing commercial regulations on non-Indian businesses that differ from those imposed on tribal enterprises. It does not follow, however, that those differences also justify abridging non-Indians' freedom of speech more severely than the freedom of their tribal competitors. For the power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does not necessarily include the power to prohibit or regulate speech about that conduct. *44 Liquormart*, 517 U.S., at 509-511, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); see *id.*, at 531532, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); *Rubin*, 514 U.S., at 483, n. 2, 115 S.Ct. 1585. It is well settled that the First Amendment mandates closer scrutiny of government restrictions on speech than of its regulation of commerce alone. *Fox*, 492 U.S., at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028. And to the extent that the purpose and operation of federal law distinguishes among information about tribal, governmental, and private casinos based on the identity of their owners or operators, the Government presents no sound reason why such lines bear any meaningful relationship to the particular interest asserted: minimizing casino gambling and its social costs by way of a (partial) broadcast ban. *Discovery Network*, 507 U.S., at 424, 428, 113 S.Ct. 1505. Even under the degree of scrutiny that we have applied in commercial speech cases, decisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical messages are in serious tension with the principles undergirding the First Amendment. Cf. *Carey v. Brown*, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980); *First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784-785, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978).

The second interest asserted by the Government--the derivative goal of "assisting" States with policies that disfavor private casinos--adds little to its case. We cannot see how this broadcast restraint, ambivalent as it is, might directly and adequately further any state interest in dampening consumer demand for casino gambling if it cannot achieve the same goal with respect to the similar federal interest.

Furthermore, even assuming that the state policies on which the Federal Government seeks to embellish are more coherent and pressing than their federal counterpart, § 1304 sacrifices an intolerable amount of truthful speech about lawful conduct when compared to all of the policies at stake and the social ills that one could reasonably hope such a ban to eliminate. The Government argues that petitioners' speech about private casino gambling should be prohibited in Louisiana because, "under appropriate conditions," 3 Record 628, citizens in neighboring States like Arkansas and Texas (which hosts tribal, but not private, commercial casino gambling) might hear it and make rash or costly decisions. To be sure, in order to achieve a broader objective such regulations may incidentally, even deliberately, restrict a certain amount of speech not thought to contribute significantly to the dangers with which the Government is concerned. See *Fox*, 492 U.S., at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028; cf. *Edge*, 509 U.S., at 429-430, 113 S.Ct. 2696. [FN8] But

Congress' choice here was neither a rough approximation of efficacy, nor a reasonable accommodation of competing state and private interests. Rather, the regulation distinguishes among the indistinct, permitting a variety of speech that poses the same risks the Government purports to fear, while banning messages unlikely to cause any harm at all. Considering the manner in which § 1304 and its exceptions operate and the scope of the speech it proscribes, the Government's second asserted interest provides no more convincing basis for upholding the regulation than the first.

FN8. As we stated in *Edge*: "[A]pplying the restriction to a broadcaster such as [respondent] directly advances the governmental interest in enforcing the restriction in nonlottery States, while not interfering with the policies of lottery States like Virginia ... [W]e judge the validity of the restriction in this case by the relation it bears to the general problem of accommodating the policies of both lottery and nonlottery States." 509 U.S., at 429-430, 113 S.Ct. 2696. The Government points out that *Edge* hypothesized that Congress "might have" held fast to a more consistent and broader antigambling policy by continuing to ban all radio or television advertisements for state-run lotteries, even by stations licensed in States with legalized lotteries. *Id.*, at 428, 113 S.Ct. 2696. That dictum does not support the validity of the speech restriction in this case. In that passage, we identified the actual federal interest at stake; we did not endorse any and all nationwide bans on nonmisleading broadcast advertising related to lotteries. As the Court explained, "Instead of favoring either the lottery or the nonlottery State, Congress opted to" accommodate the policies of both; and it was "[t]his congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States" that was "the substantial governmental interest that satisfie[d] *Central Hudson*." *Ibid.*

VI

Accordingly, respondents cannot overcome the presumption that the speaker and the audience, not the Government, should be left to assess the value of accurate and nonmisleading information about lawful conduct. *Edenfield*, 507 U.S., at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792. Had the Federal Government adopted a more coherent policy, or accommodated the rights of speakers in States that have legalized the underlying conduct, see *Edge*, 509 U.S., at 428, 113 S.Ct. 2696, this might be a different case. But under current federal law, as applied to petitioners and the messages that they wish to convey, the broadcast prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1304 and 47 CFR § 73.1211 (1998) violates the First Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Reversed.

Chief Justice REHNQUIST, concurring.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1304 regulates broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino gambling. I agree with the Court that "[t]he operation of § 1304 and its attendant regulatory regime is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies," *ante*, at 1933, that it violates the First Amendment. But, as the Court observes: "There surely are practical and nonspeech-related forms of regulation--including a prohibition or supervision of gambling on credit; limitations on the use of cash machines on casino

premises; controls on admissions; pot or betting limits; location restrictions; and licensing requirements--that could more directly and effectively alleviate some of the social costs of casino gambling." Ante, at 1934.

Were Congress to undertake substantive regulation of the gambling industry, rather than simply the manner in which it may broadcast advertisements, "exemptions and inconsistencies" such as those in § 1304 might well prove constitutionally tolerable. "The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." *Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.*, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955) (citations omitted).

But when Congress regulates commercial speech, the *Central Hudson* test imposes a more demanding standard of review. I agree with the Court that that standard has not been met here, and I join its opinion.

Justice THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.

I continue to adhere to my view that "[i]n cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace," the *Central Hudson* test should not be applied because "such an 'interest' is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of 'commercial speech' than it can justify regulation of 'noncommercial' speech." *44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island*, 517 U.S. 484, 518, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment.

ENFORCEABILITY OF 18 U.S.C. § 1302

Application of 18 U.S.C. § 1302 to prohibit the mailing of truthful advertising concerning lawful gambling operations (except as to state-operated lotteries in some circumstances) would violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Department of Justice will refrain from enforcing the statute with respect to such mailings.

LETTER TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

This is to inform you of the Department of Justice's determination that, in light of governing Supreme Court precedent, the Department cannot constitutionally continue to apply 18 U.S.C. § 1302 to prohibit the mailing of truthful information or advertisements concerning certain lawful gambling operations.

I.

The central opinion that informs the Department's decision is Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999). In that case, an association of Louisiana broadcasters and its members challenged the constitutionality of the federal statute prohibiting the broadcasting of information concerning lotteries and other gambling operations. The statute in question, 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994), provides in relevant part:

Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which a license is required by any law of the United States . . . any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

The broadcasters sought permission to broadcast advertisements for lawful casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The

Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits application of § 1304 "to advertisements of private casino gambling that are broadcast by radio or television stations located in Louisiana, where such gambling is legal." 119 S. Ct. at 1926.

The Court reviewed the constitutionality of § 1304 under the "commercial speech" test of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See Greater New Orleans, 119 S. Ct. at 1930. Under that test, when a government regulation restricts truthful speech proposing lawful commercial activity, the court must "ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. If the interest is substantial, the court determines whether the regulation "directly advances the governmental interest asserted" and whether it "is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Id. As the Court observed in Greater New Orleans, "the Government bears the burden of identifying a substantial interest and justifying the challenged restriction." 119 S. Ct. at 1930.

In the Greater New Orleans case, the government identified two basic governmental interests served by § 1304: minimizing the social costs associated with gambling or casino gambling by reducing demand, and "assisting States that 'restrict gambling' or 'prohibit casino gambling' within their borders." 119 S. Ct. at 1931-1932. The Supreme Court determined that, as applied to truthful advertising for lawful casino gambling by broadcasters located in states that permit such gambling, § 1304 does not directly advance either interest and is an impermissibly restrictive means of serving those interests. Id. at 1932-1936.

As to the government's interest in minimizing the social costs of casino gambling by reducing consumer demand, the Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he operation of § 1304 and its attendant regulatory regime is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it." Id. at 1933. The

Court pointed to the various exceptions that Congress has engrafted onto § 1304 over the years, particularly the exception for broadcast advertisements for Indian gambling (see 25 U.S.C. § 2720 (1994)). The Court concluded that by permitting advertisements for Indian casino gambling and certain other kinds of gambling to be broadcast on a nationwide basis, Congress had effectively made it impossible for § 1304 to accomplish its original goal of minimizing the social costs of gambling by reducing consumer demand. In addition, the Court noted that Congress could have employed various "practical and nonspeech-related forms of [casino gambling] regulation," such as restrictions on casino admission and credit, that "could more directly and effectively alleviate some of the social costs of casino gambling." Id. at 1934.

The Court also determined that the other asserted governmental interest, that of assisting States that restrict casino gambling, "adds little to [the government's] case." Id. at 1935. First, the statutory exceptions that prevented § 1304 from directly and materially advancing the federal government's interest in minimizing the social costs of casino gambling were equally inimical to the efforts of non-casino states: "We cannot see how this broadcast restraint, ambivalent as it is, might directly and adequately further any state interest in dampening consumer demand for casino gambling if it cannot achieve the same goal with respect to the similar federal interest." Id. (emphasis added). Second, the Court concluded that § 1304 "sacrifices an intolerable amount of truthful speech about lawful conduct when compared to all of the policies at stake and the social ills that one could reasonably hope such a ban to eliminate." Id. The Court reasoned that prohibiting casino gambling advertisements in all States in order to protect the interests of non-casino States is "neither a rough approximation of efficacy, nor a reasonable accommodation of competing State and private interests." Id.

The Court concluded by stating:

Had the Federal Government adopted a more coherent policy, or accommodated the rights of speakers in States that have legalized the underlying conduct, see [United States v.] Edge [Broadcasting Co.], 509 U.S. [418,] 428 [(1993)], this might be a different case. But under current federal law, as applied to petitioners and the messages that they wish to convey, the broadcast prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1304 and 47 CFR § 73.1211 (1998) violates the First Amendment.
Id. at 1936.

II.

After the Greater New Orleans decision was issued, the Department was required to consider whether the application of § 1304 to the broadcasting of truthful advertisements for lawful casino gambling violates the First Amendment, regardless of whether the statute is applied to broadcasts originating in States that permit casino gambling (as was the case in Greater New Orleans) or in States that do not. This question arose in the case of Players International, Inc. v. United States, 988 F. Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997), appeal pending, No. 98-5127 (3d Cir. 1999). In a supplemental brief submitted to the Third Circuit on behalf of the United States, the Justice Department observed that "while the Court's holding in Greater New Orleans is confined to broadcasts originating in casino gambling States, the Court's reasoning indicates that Section 1304, as currently written, cannot constitutionally be applied to broadcasts originating in non-casino States either." See Supplemental Brief for the Appellants at 6 (emphasis in original), Players Int'l, Inc. v. United States (No. 98-5127) ("U.S. Brief"). This view reflected the conclusion that the same deficiencies and inconsistencies that the Court in Greater New Orleans held to undermine the government interests there were also present when the statute was applied to broadcasts

originating in non-casino States.

As noted above, the Court in Greater New Orleans found that § 1304 did not directly advance the government's interest in minimizing the social costs of casino gambling because the statutory exceptions to §1304, particularly the exception for Indian gambling, preclude the statute from meaningfully reducing public demand for casino gambling. See 119 S. Ct. at 1933-35. The exception for Indian gambling is *nationwide* in scope: advertisements for Indian gambling may be broadcast in every State, including States that prohibit private casino gambling. See 25 U.S.C. § 2720. The same is true of the other statutory exceptions to § 1304 except for the one covering state lotteries. See 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (1994). As a result, the Department determined that there is no reason to believe that § 1304 is any more effective in minimizing the social costs of casino gambling for residents of non-casino States than it is for residents of casino States. See U.S. Brief at 7.

The Court in Greater New Orleans also held that § 1304 was an impermissibly restrictive means of dealing with the social costs associated with casino gambling because those costs "could [be] more directly and effectively alleviate[d]" by "nonspeech-related forms of regulation." 119 S. Ct. at 1934. The Department concluded that this determination, too, is equally applicable with respect to broadcasts originating in non-casino States. If measures such as "a prohibition or supervision of gambling on credit" are more effective than §1304 with respect to gamblers who live in States that permit casino gambling, as the Court found, they would appear to be equally effective as to gamblers who visit from non-casino States. Id.

Finally, the Department decided that the Court's conclusion in Greater New Orleans that the federal goal of assisting non-casino States "adds little to [the] case," id. at 1935, also holds true with

respect to the application of § 1304 to broadcasts originating in non-casino States themselves. The Court stressed the fact that the "ambivalent" federal advertising restriction, with its exceptions for Indian gambling and other gambling activities, cannot "directly and adequately further any state interest in dampening consumer demand for casino gambling. . . ." Id. That reasoning would rebut the argument that the application of § 1304 in non-casino States directly advances the anti-gambling policies of those States.

Given these considerations, the Department's brief in Players asserted that § 1304 may not constitutionally be applied to broadcasters who broadcast truthful advertisements for lawful casino gambling, regardless of whether the broadcasters are located in a State that permits casino gambling or one that does not. In conjunction with the filing of that brief, the Solicitor General notified both Houses of Congress that the Department is no longer defending the constitutionality of § 1304 as applied to such broadcasts. See Letters from Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives, and to Hon. Patricia Mack Bryan, Senate Legal Counsel, U.S. Senate (Aug. 6, 1999).

III.

In light of the Greater New Orleans decision, the U.S. Postal Service was faced with the question whether that opinion might also render unconstitutional certain applications of 18 U.S.C. § 1302, which prohibits the mailing of essentially the same kind of gambling-related matter covered by the analogous broadcast restrictions of 18 U.S.C. § 1304. Section 1302 provides in relevant part:

Whoever knowingly deposits in the mail, or sends or delivers by mail:

Any letter, package, postal card, or circular concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance;

....

Any newspaper, circular, pamphlet, or publication of any kind containing any advertisement of any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme of any kind offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance,

....

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both; and for any subsequent offense shall be imprisoned not more than five years.

The Postal Service therefore wrote the Department of Justice seeking its guidance as to whether § 1302 remained constitutionally enforceable.¹ The Service's letter stated: "Without some interpretation on this point the Postal Service will be in a position of receiving requests for mailing services and for interpretations of both our mailing requirements statutes and the criminal statute, which should be guided by the Department of Justice." The Service further expressed the view that, in light of the Greater New Orleans decision, § 1302 "is now indefensible in federal court." Letter from Elizabeth P. Martin, Chief Counsel, Consumer Protection Law, U.S. Postal Service, to Randolph Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Oct. 19, 1999).

After thorough consideration of the matter, I have concluded that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1302 to the mailing of truthful advertising concerning lawful gambling operations (except as to state-operated lotteries in some circumstances, see p.8, infra) would be unconstitutional. I have further concluded that, because

of such unconstitutionality, the Department should no longer enforce the statute against such mailings.

As reflected in the text of the respective statutes, § 1302 imposes restrictions on mailed communications regarding gambling or lottery matter that are nearly identical to those imposed by § 1304 with respect to broadcast communications on the same subject matter. Further, § 1302 is subject to the same weakening exceptions that the Supreme Court considered fatal to § 1304's constitutionality in Greater New Orleans. I therefore find no reasonable basis for distinguishing the provisions of § 1302 from those of § 1304 with respect to the constitutional question presented here. The former's restrictions against the mailing of truthful information concerning lawful gambling activities conflict with First Amendment standards for the same reasons that apply to the latter's restrictions against broadcasting the same kind of information.

A.

Just as the First Amendment applies to the governmental restrictions on broadcasting challenged in Greater New Orleans and Players, it applies, as well, to the governmental restrictions on the dissemination of information through the mails that are at issue here. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (federal statute prohibiting unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements held to be an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971) (invalidating administrative restrictions on mailing of obscene matter and quoting Justice Holmes dissent in Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921): "The United States may give up the post office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues."); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (statute requiring Post

Office to obtain authorization from addressee before delivering certain designated types of mail violates the addressee's First Amendment rights). As the Court observed in United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114 (1981), "[h]owever broad the postal power conferred by Article I may be, it may not of course be exercised by Congress in a manner that abridges the freedom of speech or of the press protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution."

The Supreme Court has indicated that federal government restrictions on postal communications involving commercial speech are to be evaluated using the same test applicable to broadcast communications involving commercial speech. The leading case is Bolger, in which the Court held that the provisions of 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2), prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives, were unconstitutional as applied to the informational pamphlets at issue. In so holding, the Court applied precisely the same four-part test from Central Hudson for restrictions on commercial speech that it applied to the broadcast communications at issue in Greater New Orleans. See 463 U.S. at 68-69. I therefore conclude that the Central Hudson test is applicable to 18 U.S.C. § 1302, and with the same results reached in Greater New Orleans, insofar as that statute prohibits the mailing of truthful advertising concerning lawful gambling operations.

The Court's reasoning in Greater New Orleans with respect to § 1304 is directly applicable to § 1302. The mailing prohibition of § 1302, like the broadcasting prohibition of § 1304, does not directly advance the federal government's interest in minimizing the social costs of casino gambling because it is subject to the very same nationwide statutory exceptions that the Supreme Court held fatally undermined the constitutionality of § 1304's analogous prohibitions against the broadcast of gambling advertisements. See 18 U.S.C. § 1307; 25 U.S.C. § 2720 ("sections 1301, 1302, 1303,

and 1304 of title 18 shall not apply to any gaming conducted by an Indian tribe pursuant to this chapter"). Thus, advertisements for State-conducted lotteries, Indian gaming operations, and the additional exemptions authorized by the Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2), are exempted from the mailing provisions of § 1302 as well as from the broadcast provisions of § 1304. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth by the Supreme Court in Greater New Orleans, § 1302, like § 1304, cannot constitutionally be applied to prohibit the transmission of truthful information or advertisements concerning lawful gambling activities.²

This conclusion is not intended to address the question whether Congress could amend applicable statutory law in this area in a manner that would conform to the governing constitutional standards. As the Supreme Court explained in Greater New Orleans with reference to the restrictions on broadcast advertising contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1304, "[h]ad the Federal Government adopted a more coherent policy, or accommodated the rights of speakers in States that have legalized the underlying conduct, this might be a different case." 119 S. Ct. at 1936 (citation omitted). The Department is unable to conclude, however, that existing federal law respecting the mailing of information or advertisements concerning legal gambling (apart from State-operated lotteries) is any more satisfactory in this respect than the broadcast restrictions invalidated in Greater New Orleans.

B.

In assessing the impact of Greater New Orleans on §1302's prohibitions against mailing of gaming information, I consider it important to emphasize that many significant applications of the statute should remain unaffected by that decision. Because the Department is not persuaded that the Greater New Orleans holding renders § 1302 unconstitutional in all its applications, my decision

to restrict future enforcement of the statute is limited in scope. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-82 (1983). The Department continues to regard § 1302 as enforceable in a number of significant applications.

First, my non-enforcement decision is limited to mailed information and advertisements concerning lawful gambling activities. Neither the Department nor the Postal Service asserts that § 1302 is inapplicable to, or unenforceable against, the mailing of advertisements for illegal gambling activities, and nothing in Greater New Orleans establishes that § 1302 would be unconstitutional as applied to such advertising. See 119 S. Ct. at 1930; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 n.7 (1996).

Second, my decision applies only with respect to truthful, nonmisleading gambling advertisements. Neither the Department nor the Postal Service suggests that the First Amendment entitles anyone to mail false or misleading advertising. The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that false and misleading advertising is not protected by the First Amendment, and Greater New Orleans does not suggest otherwise. See 119 S. Ct. at 1930; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.

Third, the mailings covered by my decision do not include advertisements concerning state-operated lotteries. The regulatory regime for state lottery advertising is different from that for advertising for other forms of lawful gambling: read together, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1302 and 1307(a)(1)(A) prohibit the mailing of advertisements for state lotteries contained in publications published in non-lottery States, while expressly exempting the mailing of such lottery advertisements contained in publications that are published in a lottery State. In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428 (1993), the Supreme Court expressly upheld the constitutionality of the corresponding

provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1307(a) that apply to broadcasters in non-lottery States and stressed that such application properly advanced the "congressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States."

Finally, I note that this non-enforcement decision does not extend to the application of § 1302 insofar as that section applies to the use of the mails for the actual conduct or operation of gambling activities through the mails, as distinguished from informational or advertisement mailings. Rather, this decision applies only to the enforcement of § 1302 with respect to truthful informational mailings or advertisements concerning lawful gambling.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and subject to the above-stated qualifications, I have determined that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1302 to prohibit the mailing of truthful, nonmisleading information or advertisements concerning lawful gambling operations would be unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Department will refrain from enforcing the statute with respect to such mailings.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Letter from Elizabeth P. Martin, Chief Counsel, Consumer Protection, U.S. Postal Service, for Josh Hochberg, Chief-Fraud Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Re: Interpretation of Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc., Inc. (Aug. 10, 1999).

2. Prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Greater New Orleans, two district courts had rejected First Amendment challenges to § 1302 brought by a magazine that carried advertisements for lotteries and casinos, Aimes Publications, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 86-1434, 1988 WL 19618 (D.D.C. 1988), and by an association of newspapers whose members wished to carry lottery advertising, Minnesota Newspaper Ass'n, Inc. v. Postmaster General, 677 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Minn. 1987) (§ 1302 held constitutional as applied to lottery advertisements, but unconstitutional as applied to mailing of newspapers containing prize lists), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 225 (1989). Because both of these decisions are grounded upon the courts' finding that the statute directly advances the government interests in minimizing the social costs associated with gambling, or supporting the policies of States that restrict or prohibit gambling, see 1988 WL 19618 at *3 and 677 F. Supp. at 1404-05, they cannot be reconciled with the subsequent holding in Greater New Orleans that the efficacy of the attempt to advance those interests is undercut by the statutory exemptions that permit the nationwide promotion of various kinds of gambling.

NEVADA REGULATIONS

5.011 Grounds for disciplinary action. The board and the commission deem any activity on the part of any licensee, his agents or employees, that is inimical to the public health, safety, morals, good order and general welfare of the people of the State of Nevada, or that would reflect or tend to reflect discredit upon the State of Nevada or the gaming industry, to be an unsuitable method of operation and shall be grounds for disciplinary action by the board and the commission in accordance with the Nevada Gaming Control Act and the regulations of the board and the commission. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following acts or omissions may be determined to be unsuitable methods of operation:

1. Failure to exercise discretion and sound judgment to prevent incidents which might reflect on the repute of the State of Nevada and act as a detriment to the development of the industry.
2. Permitting persons who are visibly intoxicated to participate in gaming activity.
3. Complimentary service of intoxicating beverages in the casino area to persons who are visibly intoxicated.
4. **Failure to conduct advertising and public relations activities in accordance with decency, dignity, good taste, honesty and inoffensiveness, including, but not limited to, advertising that is false or materially misleading.**

Responsible Marketing Code for Sports Wagering

The American Gaming Association (AGA) represents the U.S. casino industry, including commercial and tribal casino operators, sports betting and iGaming companies, gaming suppliers and other affiliated entities. For decades, the casino industry has operated as a constructive and responsible member of the communities in the 44 states where we operate.

Legal sports wagering is an entertainment activity that should be consumed only in a responsible manner by adults and marketed accordingly to that audience. Advertising and marketing of sports wagering services informs consumers about the nature of those services and the terms on which they are available. Advertising supports competition, multiplies consumer choice, can encourage consumer loyalty, and promotes responsible gaming initiatives. Further, advertising plays an essential role in migrating players away from the pervasive illegal market.

Since the Supreme Court decision in 2018, the AGA and our members' top priority has been getting the expansion of legal sports betting right, including advertising. The Responsible Marketing Code for Sports Wagering—first published in 2019—establishes a high standard for advertising for the legal sports betting industry, building on the AGA's longstanding [Responsible Gaming Code of Conduct](#). Members of the AGA developed this code to set the industry standard for traditional and digital marketing and advertising of sports wagering where consumers are encouraged to place real money wagers.

Accordingly, AGA members pledge in this code to adhere to certain practices in the marketing and advertising of sports wagering services relating to respect for our communities and the law, advancing responsible gaming, and promoting sound individual decision making by consumers of those services. AGA members also pledge to support access to problem gambling services.

To ensure consumer protections are holistically applied, marketing and advertising of real-money sports wagering services—conducted by both AGA and non-AGA members—shall adhere to the following standards.

CODE COMPLIANCE

The code outlines the enforcement and compliance process, which provides the opportunity for any member of the public to submit a complaint.

This self-regulated, industry-wide program is overseen by the Code Compliance Review Board (CCRB), consisting of two independent co-chairs and five AGA member representatives who each serve three-year terms.

Co-Chairs

Becky Harris, J.D., LL.M, Distinguished Fellow in Gaming, UNLV International Gaming Institute
Dr. Jennifer Shatley, Founder and Principal Consultant, Logan Avenue Consulting LLC

Member Representatives

Stephen Martino, Senior Vice President & Chief Compliance Officer, MGM Resorts International
Laura McAllister Cox, Chief Compliance Officer, Rush Street Interactive
Paul Pellizzari, Vice President, Global Social Responsibility, Hard Rock
Chris Soriano, Vice President & Chief Compliance Officer, PENN Entertainment
Andrew Sneyd, Executive Vice President, Marketing, FanDuel

Updated: March 28, 2023



Responsible Marketing Code for Sports Wagering

1. Respecting the Legal Age for Sports Wagering

- No sports betting message should be designed to appeal primarily to those below 21 – the prevailing legal age for sports wagering.
- Advertising should not depict cartoon characters or feature entertainers, athletes, influencers or music that appeal primarily to audiences below the age of 21.
- Models, actors, influencers, athletes and entertainers appearing in advertising should be a minimum of 21 years old, substantiated by proper identification.
- No message should suggest or imply that underage persons engage in sports wagering.
- Sports wagering advertising and marketing should be placed in broadcast, cable, radio, print or digital communications (e.g., social media, SMS, websites, streaming) only where at least 73.6 percent of the audience is reasonably expected to be 21 years or older (determined by using reliable, up-to-date audience composition data).¹
- No sports wagering messages—including logos, trademarks or brand names—should be used or licensed for use on clothing, toys, games or game equipment intended primarily for persons below 21.
- To the extent that promotional products carry sports wagering messages or brand information, AGA members and their employees will use commercially-reasonable efforts to distribute them only to those 21 years of age or older.

2. Limiting College and University Advertising

- Sports wagering should not be promoted or advertised in college or university-owned news assets (e.g., school newspapers, radio or television broadcasts, etc.) or advertised on college or university campuses.
- Partnerships with colleges or universities should not include any component that promotes, markets or advertises sports wagering activity. This prohibition does not apply to alumni networks or content that is exclusively focused on responsible gaming education or problem gambling awareness.
- Sportsbooks should not enter name, image and likeness (NIL) endorsements or partnerships with amateur athletes.²

3. Supporting Responsible Gaming

- Each message will contain a conspicuous responsible gaming message along with a toll-free helpline number, where practical.
- Messages will not promote irresponsible participation in sports wagering.
- No message should suggest that social, financial or personal success is guaranteed.
- No message should suggest engaging in sports wagering is without risk or utilize “risk free” language.
- No message should encourage players to chase their losses or suggest that betting is a means of solving financial problems.
- No message should imply or suggest any illegal activity of any kind.
- Messages should adhere to contemporary standards of good taste that apply to all commercial messaging, as suits the medium or context of the message.

¹ U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey. <https://data.census.gov/table?tid=ACSS15Y2020.S0101>

² For definition in this Code, “amateur athletes” refers to all intercollegiate athletes and any other amateur athlete under the age of 21.

Responsible Marketing Code for Sports Wagering

4. Controlling Digital Media & Websites

- Operator-controlled messages placed in digital media—including third party internet and mobile sites, affiliate platforms, commercial marketing emails or text messages, social media sites and downloadable content—shall comply with all applicable provisions of this Code concerning the content of such messages.
- Owned websites and apps that offer sports wagering should include a responsible gaming message and a link to a site that provides information about responsible gaming and responsible gaming services.
- Owned websites or profiles that include sports betting content, including social media pages and sites, shall include a reminder of the legal age for sports wagering.
- Age affirmation mechanisms, utilizing month, day and year of birth, will apply before a user can gain access to any page where individuals can engage in gambling.
- Owned websites will include geolocation mechanisms on those pages where individuals can engage in gambling, in order to restrict access only to those wagering within a legal jurisdiction.
- User-generated content on an owned site or web page will be monitored and moderated on a regular basis for compliance with the provisions of this code.
- Digital marketing communications will respect user privacy and comply with all applicable legal privacy requirements including those governing consent. All such messages targeting an individual recipient will be clearly identified as originating from the sports betting operator or otherwise attributable to the operator. In addition, each such message sent via email or text message will provide the option therein of opting out or unsubscribing.
- Owned websites shall disclose to users—in their terms of use or other policy statements—any practices of the website that involve sharing user information with third parties unrelated to the operator sponsoring the site.

5. Maintaining the Code

- The AGA and its members will conduct an annual review of the tenets of the code to ensure the guidelines evolve with the maturation of the legal marketplace.
- Updates will specify an effective date based on the significance of changes and commercially reasonable implementation timelines.
- Updates will apply to new marketing and advertising as of the specified effective date and not applied retroactively.
- Updates will be published and broadly publicized to ensure awareness.

6. Monitoring Code Compliance

- The AGA will offer annual training opportunities for members and employees of members involved in the advertising or marketing of sports wagering services.
- AGA members will provide training on the provisions of this code, including periodic refreshers and updates, to all individuals involved in the advertising or marketing of sports wagering services.
- AGA members will deliver a copy of this code to advertising agencies, media buyers, affiliates and other third parties involved in the member's advertising or marketing.
- AGA members shall adopt an internal review process to evaluate whether promotional and marketing messages comply with this code, and will conduct periodic reviews of promotional and marketing messages to evaluate compliance with this code.
- The commitments in this code apply to persons or entities operating in partnership with or as agents of sports wagering operators in conducting advertising and marketing activity related to sports betting.

Responsible Marketing Code for Sports Wagering

CODE COMPLIANCE PROCESS

Each member of the AGA is committed to the philosophy of and compliance with the code. All AGA members are required to review and comply with this code. Anyone engaged in U.S. sports wagering advertising and marketing is expected to adhere to the code along with adherence to applicable laws, rules and regulations.

The following complaint process enables any person or entity, including consumers, (Complainants) to flag potential violations of the code by sports betting advertisers and marketers (the Reported Company) and allow the Reported Company to respond and take corrective measures as warranted. A Reported Company does not need to be an AGA member. An AGA staff representative (AGA CCRB Liaison) will facilitate this process.

The following outlines the compliance review process, including the establishment and role of the Code Compliance Review Board (CCRB). This process will be reviewed periodically and may be updated as needed by the AGA.

Complaint Process

- The AGA will provide an online mechanism for receiving from any Complainant a written complaint that a sports betting advertising or marketing message transmitted or published by a Reported Company does not comply with the code.
- The Complainant provides a copy of the sports betting message that is the subject of the complaint, selects the provision(s) of the code in question, and describes its claimed inconsistency with or violations of the provisions of the code. The Complainant also must provide a contact name and contact information.
- The AGA CCRB Liaison is available to answer questions about the complaint submission process. The AGA CCRB Liaison will refer complete and relevant complaints to the Reported Company.
- The Reported Company will provide an initial response to the complainant and the AGA CCRB Liaison within three business days which:
 - Outlines actions taken to address the raised concern;
 - Details the Company's assessment of claim merits; and/or
 - Requests an extension of the process, which may be granted by the AGA CCRB Liaison.
- If warranted, a comprehensive response, including any additional assessments of the claim, response and/or planned corrective measures must be shared with the complainant and the AGA CCRB Liaison within seven additional business days.
- If the marketing activity in question is digital in nature, the Reported Company shall endeavor to make adjustments and/or pause the activity immediately pending internal review.
- If the Reported Company does not respond to the initial complaint, the Complainant may request further review by the CCRB as noted below.
- If the Complainant does not request further review by the CCRB, the complaint and any response will be summarized in a publicly available forum on the AGA website. The Complainant is provided the option to remain anonymous in such public reports; in such cases, only the substance of the complaint will be made public.
- If the Complainant still believes the Reported Company is non-compliant after the Reported Company responds, the Complainant can request further review by the CCRB via the AGA CCRB Liaison. This request must be received within three days of the Reported Company's response. The Complainant can offer any other material relevant to the complaint within seven days of receiving the Reported Company response. The Reported Company will also be provided the opportunity to submit any additional documentation for consideration by the CCRB. The AGA CCRB Liaison will provide all submitted materials to the CCRB via the process outlined below.

Responsible Marketing Code for Sports Wagering

CCRB Review Process

- Upon request for further review by the Complainant, the AGA CCRB Liaison will send all materials to the CCRB members for their review.
- The CCRB will meet, in person or virtually, to evaluate if the sports betting marketing or advertising activity at issue is in violation of the code.
- The CCRB will endeavor to provide written notice of its decision to the Complainant and the Reported-Company within seven business days of receiving the appeal of the complaint. In order to find that a Reporting Company is in violation of the Code, there must be an affirmative vote from at least one Chair and a majority of the Member Delegates at the meeting.
- At least one of the Chairs and three Member Delegates must be present for the CCRB to meet and decide on violations of the code. If a Member Delegate's company is the subject of a complaint or is the Complainant, such member shall be recused from the discussion and decision.
- The CCRB's written decision will include if a violation of the code has occurred and if so, that the Reported Company is expected to promptly withdraw or revise the advertising and promotional material and/or placement at issue.
- The CCRB decision, and initial complaint, will be summarized in a publicly available forum on the AGA website. The Complainant is provided the option to remain anonymous in such public reports; in such cases, only the substance of the complaint will be made public.

Code Compliance Review Board

The CCRB shall be comprised of two independent, non-gaming industry chairs (Chairs) and five AGA member representatives (Member Delegates). The Chairs shall have a relevant marketing, responsible gaming or regulatory background. Member Delegates shall be selected from the AGA membership.

All CCRB members shall serve three-year terms. Member Delegates must maintain employment at a current AGA member in good standing. Two member alternates will also be selected in the case an appointed Member Delegate resigns or cannot fulfill their obligation.

The CCRB will be engaged only after (1) a Complaint has been logged against a Reported Company; (2) the Reported Company has had the required three business days to respond or acknowledge; and (3) the Complainant requests, pursuant to the process laid out above, that the CCRB conduct a review.

Reporting

The AGA will regularly post summaries of the findings of complaints logged, Reported Company responses/actions, and CCRB decisions (as necessary) to a dedicated section of the AGA website. The Complainant is provided the option to remain anonymous in such public reports; in such cases, only the substance of the complaint will be made public. A comprehensive listing of all complete and relevant complaints and actions will be permanently available on the AGA website.

Filing A Complaint

To file a complaint about a particular sports betting advertisement or marketing material subject to this code, please visit AmericanGaming.org. Questions about the code or the compliance process can be directed to the AGA CCRB Liaison at AGACCRB@americangaming.org.

118TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 967

To prohibit the advertising of sportsbooks on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 9, 2023

Mr. TONKO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

A BILL

To prohibit the advertising of sportsbooks on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Betting on Our Future
5 Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISING OF SPORTSBOOKS**
2 **ON CERTAIN MEDIA OF ELECTRONIC COMMU-**
3 **NICATION.**

4 (a) PROHIBITION.—It shall be unlawful to advertise
5 a sportsbook on any medium of electronic communication
6 subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

7 (b) IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT.—The
8 Commission shall implement and enforce this section as
9 if this section is a part of the Communications Act of 1934
10 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.). A violation of this section, or a
11 regulation promulgated under this section, shall be consid-
12 ered to be a violation of the Communications Act of 1934,
13 or a regulation promulgated under such Act, respectively.

14 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

15 (1) COMMISSION.—The term “Commission”
16 means the Federal Communications Commission.

17 (2) SPORTING EVENT.—The term “sporting
18 event” includes a fantasy or simulation sports game
19 or contest.

20 (3) SPORTS BET OR WAGER.—The term “sports
21 bet or wager”—

22 (A) means the staking or risking by any
23 person of something of value upon the outcome
24 of a sporting event, upon an agreement or un-
25 derstanding that the person or another person

1 will receive something of value in the event of
2 a certain outcome;

3 (B) includes any scheme of a type de-
4 scribed in section 3702 of title 28, United
5 States Code; and

6 (C) does not include participation in any
7 game or contest in which participants do not
8 stake or risk anything of value other than—

9 (i) personal efforts of the participants
10 in playing the game or contest or obtaining
11 access to the internet; or

12 (ii) points or credits that the sponsor
13 of the game or contest provides to partici-
14 pants free of charge and that can be used
15 or redeemed only for participation in
16 games or contests offered by the sponsor.

17 (4) SPORTSBOOK.—The term “sportsbook”
18 means a person who is engaged in the business of—

19 (A) taking sports bets or wagers; and

20 (B) paying out winnings.

○

